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Sharing the Short Bus:
Eligibility and Identity under the IDEA
WENDY F. HENSEL*
INTRODUCTION
The landscape of education in the United States for those with
physical and mental disabilities has changed dramatically in the last
century. Prior to 1975, the opportunities for formal education available
to students with disabilities were extremely limited. Many students were
precluded from attending public school altogether, either by resistant
local officials or by force of law.' Those fortunate enough to gain
entrance through the front door were likely to be restricted to minimal
learning environments that lacked interaction with typical students.'
Being labeled as "disabled" in an educational setting, therefore, resulted
in severe stigma which substantially limited a child's opportunity for
educational advancement.
In the late i96os and early 197os, however, the emerging disability
rights movement challenged this status quo. Energized by the success of
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. The author would like
to thank Mark Weber, Robert Garda, Andi Curcio, and Kelly Timmons for their helpful comments
and advice on earlier drafts of this Article.
i. North Carolina, for example, imposed criminal penalties on parents who insisted that a child
be educated in public school once the superintendent concluded that the child should be excluded. See
Act of May i8, 1965, 1965 N.C. Sess. Laws 641, 643-44; see also Mark C. Weber, The Transformation
of the Education of the Handicapped Act: A Study in the Interpretation of Radical Statutes, 24 U.C.
DAvis L. REV. 349, 355-56 (i99o) (discussing "legislative, administrative, and judicial activity either
permitting or requiring the exclusion of these children from public education" prior to 1975).
2. See, e.g., David Egnor, Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of i996:
Overview of the U.S. Senate Bill (S.I578), ii Focus ON AUTISM & OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES
194, 194 (Winter 1996) (noting that prior to 1975, "[mlost children with disabilities who went to school
were segregated from their peers, and most young people with severe disabilities were destined to
spend their lives in an institution"); Antonis Katsiyannis et al., Reflections on the 25th Anniversary of
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 22 REMEDIAL AND SPECIAL EDuc. 324,324-25 (2001).
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minorities and women in advancing anti-discrimination legislation,3 as
well as early court victories in the seminal cases of Pennsylvania
Association for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania4 and Mills v. Board of
Education,' advocates placed Congress on notice of the demand for
improved access to and the integration of public schools for children with
disabilities. Congress responded positively by passing the Education for
All Handicapped Children Act of I975 ("EAHCA"),6 which guaranteed
children with disabilities access to public schools and to the support and
services necessary to achieve a free and appropriate public education
once admitted.7 To facilitate compliance with this mandate, Congress
also gave parents of each student with a disability the right to participate
in the development of an individualized education plan for their child"
and the right to seek judicial review in due process hearings and federal
court if school districts failed to comply with the mandates of EAHCA.9
More than thirty years and several amendments later, EAHCA, now
referred to as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"),
unquestionably has opened the door to education for children with
disabilities.'I Few voices in American discourse openly challenge the
right of these children to attend public school, and those that do are
confronted by vociferous objectors." Commentators increasingly are
3. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2000)).
4. 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 197 0 (holding that state was required to provide each student
with mental retardation with a "free public program of education and training appropriate to his
capacities").
5. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) (holding that the public schools' failure to educate children
with disabilities violates the Equal Protection Clause).
6. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975)
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491 (2000)).
7. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(i)(A) (2000) (originally enacted as Education for all Handicapped
Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142 89 Stat. 773 (1975)).
8. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (2ooo) (originally enacted as Education for all Handicapped Children Act
of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142 89 Stat. 773 (1975)).
9. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2ooo) (originally enacted as Education for all Handicapped Children Act of
1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142 89 Stat. 773 (1975)).
so. See, e.g., Katsiyannis, supra note 2, at 332 (concluding that "the right of students with
disabilities to access education is assured" thirty years after EAHCA's passage); Thomas Rentschler,
No Child Left Behind: Admirable Goals, Disastrous Outcomes, 12 WIDENER L. REv. 637, 639 (2006)
("Today, the fight over educational access [for children with disabilities] has been won.").
ii. An interesting experiment in this regard took place in May 2006. Kevin Bartol, School Board
Member of Baraboo County, Wisconsin, publicly argued that "[tlhere are some people in this country
that cannot be educated .... They may have their eyes open, but there's no one awake upstairs." See
Christina Beach, Board Member Stirs Controversy, BARABOO NEWS REPUBLIC, May 25, 2006, available
at http://www.wiscnews.com/archives/read.php?info=/bnr/2oo6/o5/25/85132.php. Bartol added that
"[p]ublic school systems are not a baby-sitting service or a nurse care service for children such as those
... [t]hey're a place to educate students." Id. The public protest against Bartol's comments was
immediate and significant. The Wisconsin Education Association Council, for example, quickly
released a statement calling Bartol's comments "abhorrent," and a local columnist noted that Bartol
"needs a lesson on compassion." See Susan Lampert Smith, School Board Rookie Needs Some
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arguing, however, that the door to special education services has opened
too widely and too indiscriminately, placing at risk the ability of school
districts to respond to the needs of students in general education.'" The
indisputable fact underlying such arguments is that the number of
children receiving services under the IDEA has skyrocketed over the last
three decades.'3 The growth of students in special education has
surpassed the growth of the general student population,'4 resulting in
heightened demand for often expensive services in a time of limited
growth in education funding generally.'" Scholars have proffered a
variety of reasons for this population explosion, ranging from
misdiagnosis by professionals and the failure of school systems generally,
to improved diagnostic techniques and rising incidence rates of autism.
Learning, Wis. STATE J., May 26, 2oo6, at AI, available at http://www.madison.com/archives/
read.php?ref=/wsj/2oo605/26/o6o526oo 5 .php. A similar public outcry took place in January 2007
when a school board official in Oregon called special education students "'slabs-slow, low and
belows."' See Kimberly Melton, Official urged to resign over special-ed remarks, THE OREGONIAN, Jan.
17, 2007, available at http://www.oregonlive.com/news/oregonian/index.ssf?/base/news/
11690o072121 1520.xml&coll=7.
12. See, e.g., Wade F. Horn & Douglas Tynan, Time to Make Education "Special" Again, in
RETHINKING SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR A NEW CENTURY 23, 26 (Chester E. Finn, Jr., et al., eds., 2001)
(discussing the "extraordinary growth" of special education "often at the expense of regular
education"); Gregory F. Corbett, Special Education, Equal Protection and Education Finance: Does
the Individuals with Disabilities Act Violate a General Education Student's Fundamental Right to
Education?, 40 B.C. L. REv. 633, 634 (999) (noting that studies demonstrate that "the share of all
spending received by general education declined from approximately eighty percent in 1967 to fifty-six
percent in 1996" while the "expenditures devoted to special education more than quadrupled from
four percent to seventeen percent").
13. See, e.g., THOMAS PARRISH ET AL, CTR. FOR SPECIAL EDUC. FIN., STATE SPECIAL EDUCATION
FINANCE SYSTEMS, 1999-2000, PART II: SPECIAL EDUCATION REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES 5-7 (2004)
(showing growth in special education students between 1977-2003); see also H.R. REP. No. io8-77, at
124 (2003) ("The number of infants and toddlers receiving services has increased dramatically in
recent years."); Terry Jean Seligmann, An IDEA Schools Can Use: Lessons From Special Education
Legislation, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 759, 765 (2001) ("Today, approximately one in ten children in the
public school system receives some kind of special educational services.").
L4. See PARRISH ET AL, supra note 13, at 8 (explaining that total student enrollment between
1994-I999 increased by 6%, while special education enrollment increased i1% for the same time
period); Robert A. Garda, Jr., The New IDEA: Shifting Educational Paradigms to Achieve Racial
Equality in Special Education, 56 ALA. L. REV. 1071, 1072-73 (2005) (noting that special education
numbers increased by 35% in the "last decade.., while school enrollment grew only I4%").
15. In the 1999-2000 school year, for example, the cost of educating a child in general education
averaged $6,556
, 
while the cost of educating a child in special education averaged 9i% higher at
$12,525. See JAY G. CHAMBERS ET AL., SPECIAL EDUC. EXPENDITURE PROJECT, CTR. FOR SPECIAL EDUC.
FIN., TOTAL EXPENDITURES FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES, 1999-2000: SPENDING VARIATION BY
DISABILITY 4 (2003).
i6. Compare Seligmann, supra note 13, at 761 ("The increasing number of children identified as
needing special education should be viewed not as a failure of special education, but as a warning
about the inability of traditional classrooms to meet the needs of many children."), with Sheldon
Berman et al., Rising Costs of Special Education in Massachusetts: Causes and Effects, in RETHINKING
SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR A NEW CENTURY, supra note 12, at 183, 183 (identifying the "root causes" of
the increase in special education students in Massachusetts and nationally as "advances in medical
technology, the deinstitutionalization of children with special needs, privatization of services, and
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Some pundits have alternatively speculated that highly educated and
affluent parents are fueling the rise in numbers by aggressively seeking
eligibility for modestly impaired children as a way to secure from districts
expensive services that are not otherwise available to children in the
general school population." Despite the disparate nature of such
explanations, a common theme among them is that eligibility under the
IDEA is too expansive and no longer serves the "truly disabled" as
Congress intended.'8 Because the majority of growth has occurred at the
margin among students with more moderate disabilities, 9 calls to restrict
eligibility to the more substantially impaired are increasingly common,"
economic and social factors including increases in the number of children in poverty and the number
of families experiencing social and economic stress"), and Raymond F. Palmer et al., Environmental
Mercury Release, Special Education Rates, and Autism Disorder: An Ecological Study of Texas, 12
HEALTH & PLACE 203, 207 (2oo6) (concluding that study showed "that school district autism and special
education rates are significantly associated with environmentally released mercury").
17. See, e.g., Horn & Tynan, supra note 12, at 30 (attributing the rise in special education students
in part to "[tihe fact that being found eligible for special education brings with it entitlement to an
array of often expensive services and accommodations"); cf Daniela Caruso, Bargaining and
Distribution in Special Education, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 171, 174, 179 (2005) (explaining that
parents who have "financial and educational resources" are likely to secure Individualized
Educational Programs (IEPs) which are "better written ... contain more clearly measurable goals...
and [are] more easily enforceable against non-compliant districts").
i8. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 108-77, at 84 (20o3) ("The overidentification of children as disabled
and placing them in special education where they do not belong ... takes valuable resources away
from students who truly are disabled."); see also SALVATORE PIZZURO, THE INDIVIDUALS WITH
DISABILIEs EDUCATION ACT AND THE NATURE OF AMERICAN POLmcs: A HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC POLICY
141 (2001) ("The inevitable political backlash of [the growth in special education] is already occurring.
Critics of special education programs have launched the argument that the increasing numbers are
indicative of the 'false identification' of many children as having special needs."); Garda, supra note
14, at 1074 (arguing that special education must be "reclaim[ed]" and "plac[ed] ... back in the hands
of the genuinely disabled").
19. See, e.g., Horn & Tynan, supra note 12, at 26 (explaining that of the "more than so percent of
all school children in grades K-12" in special education, "approximately go percent have been
classified as having relatively mild disabilities"); Rentschler, supra note to, at 658 ("Of the 6.6 million
students currently receiving special education services, sixty-seven percent have a specific learning
disability, speech, or language impairment. Fewer than twelve percent have disabilities that present
significant cognitive impairments such as mental retardation or traumatic brain injury."); Seligmann,
supra note 13, at 768 ("The largest disability category, and the one in which the most growth has
occurred, is that of learning disabilities.").
20. See, e.g., Horn and Tynan, supra note 12, at 37 ("With the number of persons believed to have
learning disabilities approaching 2o percent of the population, can society afford this canopy of
protective services and accommodations?"). Horn and Tynan propose that rather than providing
special education to students with "mild forms of neurological disorders" like learning disabilities,
mild mental retardation, and ADD, society "should re-construct regular education so as to maintain
these students more effectively in the regular classroom." Id. at 41-42; see also Garda, supra note 14,
at 1131-32 ("The strict definition [of child with a disability] will reserve eligibility for high-need
children, the primary concern of the IDEIA, and prevent low-need children from displacing or
draining resources from those truly in need."); Mark C. Weber, Reflections on the New Individuals
with Disabilities Education Improvement Act, 58 FLA. L. REV. 7, 22 (2006) ("When federal money is
provided for special education with too few eligibility strings attached, general education absorbs it
and the federal goal of helping children with disabilities is frustrated.").
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and more courts and administrative hearing officers are requiring
evidence of serious academic failure before eligibility is deemed
appropriate under the IDEA. I
At the heart of the eligibility debate is the question of which
children are "disabled enough" to qualify for protection and services
under the statute, or, as the title of this Article implies, which children
are appropriately placed on the "short bus," an immediately recognizable
symbol of children with disabilities in public school." Many disability
scholars have explored the definition and imagery of disability embraced
by the Americans with Disabilities Act23 and the Rehabilitation Act, 4
using both social disability theory and historical conceptions of stigma to
explain how statutory definitions have driven litigation outcomes and
societal resistance to expansive rights. 5 Legal scholars have paid scant
attention, however, to the imagery of disability embraced by the IDEA
and its impact on the definition of "child with a disability," the statutory
precursor to coverage. 6 This is perhaps explained by a sense that the
former statutes are more radical, placing governmentally-imposed
positive obligations of accommodation and anti-discrimination on private
business in contrast to state and local governments via school districts.
As the cost of IDEA compliance increasingly leads the public to view the
statute as forcing the transfer of wealth between the general student
population and students with disabilities, however, public scrutiny of the
protected class is likely to increase, as well as calls for retrenchment of
rights and privileges for students with disabilities. 7 It is critical, then, to
21. See discussion infra Part 11.
22. The term "short bus" is used despite its negative connotation for children with disabilities
because it is a powerful image representing the division between typical and disabled students. Many
in society have a clear image of the children they believe belong on the bus and those that do not.
Children who look and act like typical peers in any meaningful respect are generally placed in the
latter category. This Article explores why that is so, and why society's inability to understand disability
as a common trait shared by many children could lead to restricted eligibility and funding under the
IDEA.
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (200o).
25. See, e.g., Lisa Eichhorn, Major Litigation Activities Regarding Major Life Activities: The
Failure of the "Disability" Definition in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 77 N.C. L. REV.
1405, 1414-16 (1999); Wendy F. Hensel, Interacting With Others: A Major Life Activity Under the
Americans With Disabilities Act?, 2002 Wis. L. REV. 1139 (2002); Miranda Oshige McGowan,
Reconsidering the Americans with Disabilities Act, 35 GA. L. REV. 27 (2000).
26. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)-(B) (2o00).
27. See, e.g., Pizzuro, supra note 18, at 141 ("[Tlhe dramatic growth of special education has
resulted in a siphoning of funds from regular education programs, resulting in the alienation of parents
of non-disabled children and regular educators."); Caruso, supra note 17, at 193 ("Funding special
education involves a leap of faith, and such leaps are especially vulnerable to political pressure. When
costs rise beyond politically acceptable levels, administrators are bound to redefine both identification
and service standards to make ends meet."); Mark Kelman, The Moral Foundations of Special
Education Law, in RETHINKING SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR A NEW CENTURY, supra note 12 at 77, 82 ("In a
world of limited resources, it is plainly not enough to say that children with learning disabilities
June 20071
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understand whether the legislation's current approach to disability and
eligibility enhances the integration and advancement of children with
impairments or reinforces the stigma of difference and inequality.
This Article evaluates this important question and explores the legal
and social implications of the rising number of special education students
on the perimeters of the protected class. Part I examines the legislative
evolution of eligibility from passage of EAHCA through each successive
reauthorization of the statute. Part II then explores current trends in
eligibility determinations, looking to judicial and administrative decisions
interpreting the meaning of "child with a disability." This section
highlights and critically evaluates the ways in which courts and hearing
officers have used the vagueness of the statutory terms to endorse an
increasingly narrow view of disability. Finally, Part III evaluates the legal
and public policy implications of the shift towards restrictive eligibility
under the IDEA. It concludes that although the special education
population increasingly includes students with more moderate, intangible
impairments, this growth is positive in some respects and consistent with
early Congressional intent to bring all students, regardless of functioning,
into the mainstream of American education. Calls to restrict the
protected class to the "truly disabled," as defined to include only those
children with the most severe impairments, represent a retrenchment of
the medical model of disability and would erode the gains made in
reducing the stigma of disability in American education. As a result, the
debate over the growth of special education is more appropriately
focused on the extent of services available to students with disabilities
rather than the characteristics of the students who are receiving services.
I. LEGISLATIVE INTERPRETATION OF "CHILD WITH A DISABILITY"
The legislative history of EAHCA and its subsequent amendments
provide insight into Congressional understanding of disability and its
relationship to eligibility under the statute. What follows is a brief
discussion of the original legislation and each subsequent amendment as
it relates to identifying the class of children protected under the Act.
A. THE EDUCATION FOR HANDICAPPED CHILDREN ACT OF 1975
Although Congress provided incentives to States prior to 1975 to
encourage the provision of special education, 8 its passage of EAHCA
stands as a watershed moment in the history of disability legislation.2 9
'deserve' more resources; their claims inevitably compete with claims that could be made by other
'deserving' pupils.").
28. See, e.g., Jo Ann Engelhardt, The Education for All Handicapped Children Act: Opening the
Schoolhouse Door, 6 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 43, 45-46 (1975) (detailing early federal
legislation relating to children with disabilities); Katsiyannis et al., supra note 2, at 325 (same).
29. Egnor, supra note 2, at 195 ("Disability advocates, parents, educators and community leaders
1Vol. 58: 1147
SHA RING THE SHOR T B US
The statute was conceived of as a spending measure conditioning States'
receipt of federal funds on the provision of a "free appropriate public
education" to "all handicapped children" between the ages of three and
twenty-one."0 The final bill defined the protected class to include the
"mentally retarded, hard of hearing, deaf, speech impaired, visually
handicapped, seriously emotionally disturbed, orthopedically impaired,
or other health impaired children, or children with specific learning
disabilities, who by reason thereof require special education and related
services."3
The legislation in its earliest form was not eagerly embraced by all.
President Ford was known to oppose the bill, which he called "the
potentially most expensive piece of legislation for disabled people ever
passed by Congress., 3' At the time of the debate, it was believed that
"approximately 12 percent" of children between the ages of five and
seventeen had "some type of handicap. 33 The floor debate and
conference reports reflect concerns that this number could potentially
rise even higher as the result of the mislabeling and over-identification of
children as being disabled.34 The Senate Labor and Public Welfare
Committee, for example, recommended that the bill pass, but
acknowledged that members were
deeply concerned.., about the practices and procedures which result
in classifying children as having handicapping conditions when, in fact,
they do not have such conditions.
At least three major issues are of concern with respect to problems
of identification and classification: (i) the misuse of appropriate
identification and classification data within the educational process
hailed the passage of P.L. 94-142 as the 'Bill of Rights of the Handicapped."').
30. 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (Supp. V 1975). The statute provided that with respect to children aged three
to five and eighteen to twenty-one, "the requirements of this clause shall not be applied in any State if
the application of such requirements would be inconsistent with State law or practice." Id. Thus, states
"may choose not to serve children from the ages of three through five and eighteen through twenty-
one if children without disabilities of the same ages are not provided public education." MARK C.
WEBER, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW AND LITIGATION TREATISE 2:1 (2002).
31. 20 U.S.C. § 1401() (Supp. V 1975).
32. Pizzuro, supra note 18, at 42-43. President Ford reportedly only signed the bill because
Congress had sufficient support to override his veto. He nevertheless indicated upon signing that he
believed it "was a mistake for the nation, and that he looked forward to its eventual repeal." Id. at 44,
46.
33. 121 CONG. REC. 25526, 25541 (1975) (statement of Rep. Harkin) (citing statistics from the
Bureau of Education for the Handicapped); see also 121 CONG. REC. 25526, 25531 (1975) (statement of
Rep. Lehman) (citing evidence that "about I to 3 percent [of students] have so far been able to be
identified as learning disabilities [sic]"); Engelhardt, supra note 28, at 47-48 (noting that at the time
EAHCA was passed, "a conservative estimate" would count "one out of ten school-age children [as]
handicapped.").
34- See, e.g., 121 CONG. REC. 23701, 23703 (1975); 121 CONG. REC. 25526, 25537 (1975) (statement
of Rep. McKay) ("[T]his funding level encourages States to classify children as handicapped who are
not handicapped.... [T]his would be harmful to those children who are misclassified.").
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itself; (2) discriminatory treatment as the result of the identification of
a handicapping condition; and (3) misuse of identification procedures
or methods which results in erroneous classification of a child as having
a handicapping condition.35
Several members of Congress were particularly concerned with the
inclusion of specific learning disabilities (SLD) as a categorical disability
in the final bill, believing it to be too expansive and amorphous. 6 The
category was added by amendment in committee hearings," a fact that
scholars have identified as a "major coup for disability advocates.""5
Even supporters acknowledged concerns that the amended bill would
protect not only children with "serious" disabilities, like "those in wheel
chairs, those totally deaf or blind and needing special education," but
also children with "borderline cases ... [such as] aphasia, dyslexia, and
minimal brain dysfunction, all of which are sometimes difficult to
diagnose."" Members worried that the resulting eligibility "definitions
[would be] broad or narrow, depending on who is defining them. 40
In response to these concerns, Congress made clear that states
should give first priority under the Act to securing an education for those
children not currently receiving one, and second to serving the most
severely handicapped children within each disability category.4 In
addition, the final version of the bill included a provision that precluded
states from identifying more than 12% of the school age population
between five and seventeen as handicapped children for purposes of
securing funding42 and capped the number of children who could be
identified as SLD at 2% of that amount.43 To further alleviate concerns
with the SLD category, Congress revised the bill to provide that the
category specifically excluded children who have "learning problems that
[are] primarily the result of... environmental, cultural or economic
35. S. REP. No. 94-168, at 26-27 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1450. Some of
Congress' concerns were based on the belief that some of the tests used to identify disabilities were
biased and discriminatory. See 121 CONG. REC. 25526, 25539 (1975) (statement of Rep. Miller).
36. 121 CONG. REC. 25526
, 
25531 (1975) (statement of Rep. Quie).
37- Id.
38. Tyce Palmaffy, The Evolution of the Federal Role, in RETHINKING SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR A
NEW CENTURY, supra note 12, at I, 8.
39. 121 CONG. REC. 23701, 23705 (1975) (statement of Rep. Bauman).
40. Id.
41. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(3) (Supp. V 1975). The Conference Report clarified that "[t]he Conferees
wish to make very clear that, with respect to the second priority, it is not intended that any one or two
categories of disabilities be recognized ... as the 'most severe' categories, but rather that an attempt
must be made to reach and provide appropriate services to children with the most severe handicaps
without regard to disability category." S. RP. No. 94-455, at 37 (1975) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in
1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 148o, 1491.
42. 20 U.SC. § 14II(a)(5)(A)(i)-(ii) (Supp. V 1975); see also 121 CONG. REC. 23701, 23703, 23705
("This cap would not allow States to define everyone in the State as sort of handicapped so they could
get more aid and share in the educational funds.").
43. 20 USC. § 141 I(a)(5)(A)(i)-(ii) (Supp. V 1975).
[Vol. 58: 1147
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disadvantage."'
The final bill enjoyed widespread bipartisan support and was passed
by a large margin.45 Although states thereafter were free to either accept
or reject federal funding pursuant to the statute, virtually every state
moved quickly to accept the financial support and the legal ramifications
attached thereto.46 Congress has never fully funded the Act, however,
and to date has not reached its goal of paying for 40% of the costs
incurred by states in educating students with disabilities.47
B. 1975-1996
The years following passage of EAHCA saw an expansion of
eligibility to young children and to children with impairments not
originally conceived of in the initial debates. Although some in Congress
were quick to recognize the desirability of early intervention services,
EAHCA as enacted did not focus on the needs of very young children.
Congress rectified this situation with the Fassage of the Education of the
Handicapped Act Amendments of I986.' The Amendments added Part
H to the statute, giving children between birth and the age of two who
displayed disabilities or developmental delays the ability to receive early
intervention services and family assistance.49 Congress believed that
expanding eligibility in this way would ultimately "minimiz[e] the need
for special education and related services after [handicapped] infants and
44. 20 U.S.C. § 14o(3o)(C) (2000). The Senate Report clarified that the "term does not include
children who may be slow learners." S. REP. No. 94-168, at Io (975), as reprinted in 1975
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1434. Hoping to develop additional clarification on the issue, Congress also
directed the Commissioner of Education to develop regulations within one year that "establish specific
criteria for determining whether a particular disorder or condition may be considered a specific
learning disability," and to "describe diagnostic procedures which shall be used in determining
whether a particular child has a disorder or condition which places such child in the category of
children with specific learning disabilities." Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub.
L. No. 94-142, § 62o(b)(i), 89 Stat. 773, 794 (s975); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1411 (2000) (detailing prior
provisions in section).
45. Palmaffy, supra note 38, at 6 ("The final vote was 375 to 44 in the House, 83 to io in the
Senate.").
46. All but one state, New Mexico, had elected to participate through receipt of federal funds by
1979. See Rosalie Levinson, The Right to a Minimally Adequate Education for Learning Disabled
Children, 12 VAL. U. L. REV. 253, 277 n.135 (1978).
47. See, e.g., Katsiyannis et al., supra note 2, at 329 ("The actual levels of funding to the states...
have usually amounted to approximately 8% to io% of states' total expenditures on special
education."). Congress has, however, stepped up its funding of the IDEA over time. A recent report
concluded that "[tiotal federal appropriations increased from approximately $252 million in 1977-78
to $7.5 billion in 2002-03. The federal share increased from $72 per special education child in 1977-78
to $1,159 per special education child in 2002-03, while the [average per pupil expenditure] increased
from $1,4o3 to $7499." PARRISH, ET AL., supra note 13, at 3.
48. Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-457, too Stat. 1145
(1986).
49. Id. Part H was reclassified as Part C as a result of the 1997 reauthorization of the IDEA. See
20 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1445 (2000).
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toddlers ... reach school age," "maximize the potential for individuals
with disabilities to live independently," and "enhance the capacity of
families to meet the special needs" of these children." The Act also
created a new grant program generating incentives for states to develop
preschool special education programs for children between the ages of
three and five.'
The Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990 went
still further in expanding eligibility under the statute. The nomenclature
of the protected class was changed from "handicapped children" to
"children with disabilities,"53 and the statute was renamed the Individual
with Disabilities Education Act in recognition of the changing dynamics
of special education and the emergence of "people-first" terminology.'
Congress expanded the categorical disabilities identified in the act by
adding autism and traumatic brain injury to the list,5 and changed the
language of the statute to mandate that those seeking eligibility show
they "need" special education and related services rather than that they
"require" the same." Congress also requested public input on "the
appropriate components of an operational definition ... of 'attention
deficit disorder"' ("ADD") in response to the growing number of
children receiving this diagnosis. 7 Shortly thereafter, the Department of
Education issued a Policy Clarification Memorandum on Attention
Deficit Disorders stating that children with ADD may qualify for
services under the disability category of other health impaired (OHI),'8 a
position it later codified in the regulations interpreting the IDEA. 9
50. 20 U.S.C. § 1471(a)(I)-(4) (1986), amended by 20 U.S.C. § 1431(a)(I)-(4) (2000).
51. Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-457 § 201, io Stat.
1145 (1986). Importantly, "[s]tates already serving children from birth continued to be bound by Part
B for these children for the first four years of the program." WEBER, supra note 30, at 2:1. Congress
enhanced and strengthened these services pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
Amendments of i99i to create a "seamless web" of service delivery for children from birth to age five.
See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendment of i99I, Pub. L. No. 102-119, 1O5 Stat.
587 (991).
52. Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 199 o , Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. I 103
(990).
53. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3) (20oo).
54. Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 19o, Pub. L. No. 101-476 § 9oi(b), 104
Stat. 1103 (1990o).
55. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(i) (200o).
56. Id, § 14 o1(3)(A)(ii).
57. Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 19o, Pub. L. No. 101-476, § 1o2(a)-(b),
104 Stat. 1103 (1990o).
58. i8 IDELR 116 (U.S. DOE i99I); see also Palmaffy, supra note 38, at 2 (noting that a 280%
increase in the category occurred over approximately ten years).
59. Assistance for the Education of Children with Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, (Aug. I4,
2oo6) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. Pt. 300).
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C. THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT AMENDMENTS
OF 1997
The most sweeping overhaul of the Act since its passage occurred
when the 105th Congress passed the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act Amendments of 1997 .6' Although the most significant
changes related to disciplinary placements and accountability, Congress
also meaningfully amended the definition of "child with a disability" by
giving states the discretion to include children between the ages of three
and nine experiencing "developmental delays" in the coverage of the
statute.6' By some accounts, this expanded the pool of children
potentially eligible under the IDEA by an estimated I0%.62 Congress was
motivated in part by the recognition that young children do not always
fall neatly within a category of disability identified in the Act.63 By adding
the broad category of "developmental delay" for younger children, it
hoped that states could avoid problems associated with early
mislabeling. 64
Eligibility issues also took prominence in the 1996 and 1997
committee hearings preceding the Amendments' passage. 6' The Senate
Committee on Labor and Human Resources made clear that the
eligibility determination must be "comprehensive" and "include
information on the cognitive, emotional, social and behavioral factors in
addition to physical or developmental factors, if necessary, to establish
that a child is eligible for special education and related services." 66 This
emphasis in part derived from the continued concern with the existence
of a "growing problem [of] ... identifying children as disabled when they
might not be truly disabled," particularly among African-American
males.67 Congress attributed the problem in part to the funding formula
under the IDEA at that time, which allocated money based on an annual
child count rather than a population-based method.68 The final bill
included a new weighted formula to be applied to appropriations in
excess of the $4.9 billion made for fiscal year I999, awarding 85% of
funding based on the number of students identified as eligible for
services in the appropriate age range and 15% based on student poverty
6o. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17, ii
Stat. 37 (1997).
61. 20 U.S.C. § 14 OI(3)(B) (2000).
62. H.R. REP. No. 104-614, at 38 (1996).
63. S. REP. No. 105-17, at 6 (1997).
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 104-275, at 48 (1996).
66. Id.
67. H.R. REP. No. 1O4-614, at 9 (1996); see also S. REP. No. 105-17, at 8-9 (1997).
68. H.R. REP. No. 104-614, at to (1996) (citing comments by the Inspector General of the
Department of Education); S. REP. No. 105-17, at 8 (1997).
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rates.69 Congress also directed states to "provide for the collection and
examination of data to determine if significant disproportionality based
on race is occurring . . . with respect to particular disability categories or
types of educational setting. 70
Congress did not limit its concern to misidentification based on race.
Committee reports from both the House and Senate also expressed the
belief that there are "substantial numbers of children who are likely to be
identified as disabled because they have not received proper academic
support previously," or because of "limited English proficiency . . .
cultural or environmental factors or by economic disadvantage."7' The
House urged the Department of Education and state agencies to give
such considerations "the utmost emphasis in every evaluation."72 The
final bill, moreover, amended the definition of "child with a disability" to
provide that "a child shall not be determined to be a child with a
disability if the determinant factor for such determination is lack of
instruction in reading or math or limited English proficiency. 73 The
Senate Committee articulated its belief that this change would "lead to
fewer children being improperly included in special education programs
where their actual difficulties stem from another cause . . . [and
encourage] schools to focus greater attention on these subjects in the
early grades."74
Notwithstanding these general concerns with expansive eligibility,
Congress again articulated its commitment to the inclusion of ADD in
the OHI category of disability.75 Recognizing that many parents were
experiencing difficulty with eligibility determinations, the committee
reports stated that Congress intended that children with this disorder
should "be eligible for assessment to no lesser extent than other
children ' ', 6 and should "be fully and properly served" once identified as
eligible under the IDEA.77
69. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17, III
Stat. 37, 49 § 611(e)(3) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 141i(a)(2)(B)(iii)(I)-(II) (2000)); see also
PARRISH ET AL., supra note 13, at 4 (discussing changes in resource allocation following the 1997
reauthorization).
70. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act § 618(c); see also S. REP. No. 105-17, at 32 (I997).
71. S. REP. No. 105-I7, at 5 (1997) (identifying concern with "the continued inappropriate
placement of children from minority backgrounds and children with limited English proficiency in
special education"); H.R. REP. No. 104-614, at 13 (1996).
72. H.R. REP. No. IO4-614, at 14 (1996).
73. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17,
§ 614(b)(5), III Stat. 37,82 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(5) (2000)).
74. S. REP. No. 105-17, at 19 (1997).
75. See H.R. REP. No. 104-614, at 14 (1996); S. RaP. No. 104-275, at 38 (1996).
76. H.R. REP. No. 104-614, at 14 (1996).
77. S. REP. No. 104-275, at 38 (1996).
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D. THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION IMPROVEMENT ACT OF
2004
Concerns with the improper eligibility determinations came to the
forefront of the committee hearings and legislative debate preceding the
passage of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act
of 2004. The House Committee on Education and the Workforce alone
held at least three hearings specifically relating to these issues,"
concluding that "[t]he overidentification of children as disabled and
placing them in special education where they do not belong hinders the
academic development of these students . . . [and] takes valuable
resources away from students who truly are disabled."' Congress
reaffirmed its earlier finding that this problem had arisen "largely
because the children do not have appropriate reading skills" and
concluded that it could be alleviated by making funds more generally
available to help struggling children."' Congress thus amended the statute
to permit local education agencies to use up to 15% of their funding for
"early intervening services" for students "who have not been identified
as needing special education or related services but who need additional
academic and behavioral support to succeed in a general education
environment. ,82 Congress believed these changes would "help
differentiate between students who have different learning styles and
students that have disabilities, especially learning disabilities," 3 reduce
referrals to special education, and "benefit[] ...the regular education
environment.., by reducing academic and behavioral problems."
84
Congress took more radical action with respect to the definition of
specific learning disabilities in the statute. The IDEA has always defined
specific learning disabilities to mean "a disorder in one or more of the
78. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. Io8-446, H8
Stat. 2647 (2004).
79. H.R. REP. No. io8-77, at 79-80 (2003). Those hearings included: (i) "Overidentification Issues
Within the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and the Need for Reform" on October 4, 2ooi;
(ii) "Learning Disabilities and Early Intervention strategies: How to Improve the Special Education
Referral and Identification Process" on June 6, 2002; and (iii) "IDEA: Focusing on Improving Results
for Children with Disabilities" on March 13, 2003, which included a discussion of the
"overidentification of minority children as having disabilities ... and improving the identification
process of determining whether a child has a specific learning disability." Id.
80. H.R. REP. No. io8-77, at 84 (2003); see also S. REP. No. io8-185, at 22 (2003).
81. H.R. REP. No. io8-77, at io6 (2003).
82. 20 U.S.C. § 1413(f)(1) (2004); see also H.R. REP. No. Io8-77, at 84 (2003).
83. H.R. REP. No. 108-77, at 104 (2003). The House Committee on Education and Workforce
made clear that "[sipecial education is not intended to serve as an alternative place to serve childrta if
the local educational agency has failed to teach these children how to read." Id. at io6; see also Weber,
supra note 20, at 22 (noting that Congress' authorization of pre-referral funds "responds to critics who
contend that eligibility standards under the law may be artificial and keep many children who need
special attention from obtaining federally funded services").
84. S. REP. No. I08-i85, at 22-23 (2003).
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basic psychological processes involved in understanding or in using
language, spoken or written, which disorder may manifest itself in the
imperfect ability to listen, think, speak, read, write, spell, or do
mathematical calculations." ' Prior to the reauthorization, the regulations
provided that in order to find a specific learning disability, the IEP team
must identify "a severe discrepancy between achievement and
intellectual ability" in at least one of the enumerated areas.86 Some
educators and scholars had decried the "severe discrepancy" standard as
requiring students to fail before they could establish eligibility8, Still
others argued that this standard placed artificial emphasis on intelligence
testing and insufficient attention on the child's contextual performance in
the classroom. The Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and
Pensions ultimately concluded that "there is no evidence that the IQ-
achievement discrepancy formula can be applied in a consistent and
educationally meaningful (i.e., reliable and meaningful) manner." 9
As a result of such criticism, Congress amended the statute in 2004
to provide that districts "shall not be required" to use the severe
discrepancy model previously mandated.' Instead, the statute permits
and the regulations require local education agencies to allow the use of
"a process that determines if the child responds to scientific, research-
based intervention as a part of the evaluation procedures."'" This
85. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(30)(A) (2004). Specific learning disabilities do not include "a learning
problem that is primarily the result of visual, hearing, or motor disabilities, of mental retardation, of
emotional disturbance, or of environmental, cultural, or economic disadvantage." Id. § 14 o( 3 o)(C).
86. Assistance for the Education of Children with Disabilities, 7 Fed. Reg. 46,755 (Aug. 14,
2006) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300). The enumerated areas included (i) oral comprehension; (ii)
listening comprehension; (iii) written expression; (iv) basic reading skill; (v) reading comprehension;
(vi) mathematics calculation; or (vii) mathematics reasoning. Id. For a general discussion of the history
and foundation of this regulation, see Nicole Ofiesh, Response to Intervention and the Identification of
Specific Learning Disabilities: Why We Need Comprehensive Evaluations as Part of the Process, 43
PSYCHOL. IN THE SCHOOLs 883, 884-85 (2006).
87. Stanley S. Herr, Special Education Law and Children with Reading and Other Disabilities, 28
J.L. & Eluc. 337, 355 (1999) (noting that the discrepancy model contributes to the "delayed
identification of learning disabilities" and exhibits "potential cultural bias"); cf H.R. REP. No. IO8-77,
at Io8 (2003) (comments by David W. Gordon, Superintendent of Elk Grove Unified School District)
(noting that the response to intervention approach "changes the paradigm from failing first to
preventing failure in the first place").
88. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1o8-77, at 107 (2003) (comments by Dr. Robert Pasternack, Assistant
Secretary for Special Education and Rehabilitative Services, U.S. Department of Education) ("We
know that using IQ discrepancy between the test and performance is not always an indicator of a
learning disability .... [This] approach[] to assessment may clearly result in some children who need
services not getting them while others who do not need them will receive them."); Weber, supra note
20, at 26-27 (explaining that this change "arises from distrust over conventional methods, such as IQ
testing, for finding learning disabilities, as well as questions about the integrity of the learning
disabilities category itself").
89. S. REP. No. io8-i85, at 26 (2003).
90. 20 U.S.C. § 141 4 (b)(6)(A) (2004).
91. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(6)(B) (2004); Assistance for the Education of Children with Disabilities,
71 Fed. Reg. 46,540,46,543 (Aug. 14, 2o06) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300).
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methodology, commonly referred to as "RTI," or Response to
Intervention, is triggered when a student experiences academic delays in
the classroom, at which point teachers implement a series of research-
based interventions to remediate the difficulties. Because students
without disabilities are believed to be able to make satisfactory progress
when presented with quality instruction and remedial services, a
student's failure to respond to the interventions is viewed as evidence
that an underlying learning disability exists.92 Congress believed that the
RTI method would allow "eligibility for special education services [to]
focus on the children who, even with these services, are not able to be
successful"93  and facilitate the availability of "a continuum of
intervention options-regular and special educators and related service
providers working together as part of a coherent system that is
accountable for educational outcomes for students with SLD."'
Once again, however, Congress did not believe that reading
problems were the only cause of improper eligibility determinations.95
The committee reports emphasized Congress' concern with the
"disproportionate number of minority students ... wrongly placed in
special education rather than being provided positive behavioral
interventions and supports and intensive educational interventions.
' '
,
6
Congress deemed it particularly problematic that large numbers of
African-American students were being identified as mentally retarded
and emotionally disturbed.97 As a result, Congress amended the statute
to require states to have in place "policies and procedures designed to
prevent the inappropriate overidentification or disproportionate
representation by race and ethnicity of children as children with
disabilities."0 Congress also provided that it shall be "a priority" of the
Secretary of Education and States to monitor for "[d]isproportionate
representation of racial and ethnic groups in special education.., to the
extent the representation is the result of inappropriate identification.""
When the Secretary determines that a "significant disproportionality
based on race and ethnicity is occurring," the Secretary shall require the
local educational agency to reserve 15% of its funding "to provide
comprehensive coordinated early intervening services to serve children
in the local educational agency, particularly children in those groups that
92. For a complete discussion of the RTI method, see NAT'L JOINT COMMITrEE ON LEARNING
DISABILITIES, RESPONSIVENESS TO INTERVENTION AND LEARNING DISABILITIES (2005),
http://www.ncld.org/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=497.
93. H.R. REP. No. IO8-77, at IO8 (2003).
94. S. REP. No. io8-85, at 27 (2003).
95. H.R. REP. No. IO8-77, at 84 (2003).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(24) (2004).
99. Id. § 106(a)(3).
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were significantly overidentified."'
The House also for the first time identified potential concern with
the variations in eligibility criteria between the states. The bill approved
by the House Committee on Education and Workforce included a
provision requiring the Comptroller General of the GAO to review "the
disparity between the different interpretations of the subcategories of
'child with a disability"' in each state so that Congress could consider
how to "increase uniformity of application" and ensure "that every child
receive[s] the education most appropriate for their particular needs .... .
Neither the Senate bill nor the final version of the amendments,
however, included this provision. 2
II. JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION OF "CHILD WITH A
DISABILITY"
The legislative history of the term "child with a disability" largely
reflects an expansion of coverage over the last thirty years, coupled with
concerns that children who are not "truly disabled" are being mislabeled
and over-identified. Such concerns, however, have not translated into
clear eligibility criteria to assist school districts in determining coverage
under the statute. The vagueness of the statutory terms allows the
ideological and political motivations of the eligibility team to potentially
play prominent roles in eligibility determinations."'3 As a result, much of
the imagery of disability underlying the IDEA has developed in the
context of administrative decisions and judicial opinions evaluating
challenges to the denial of eligibility.
As detailed above, the statute itself nominally defines "child with a
disability" as a child between the ages of three and twenty-one"04 who has
an enumerated impairment and, "by reason thereof, needs special
Ioo. Id. § 1418(d).
IoI. H.R. REP. No. 1O8-77, at 89 (2003).
IO2. H.R. REP. No. IO8-779, at 175 (2004) (Conf. Rep).
103. See, e.g., Horn & Tynan, supra note 12, at 26 ("Within states, and between school systems,
there exists enormous variability regarding which students are found to be eligible for special
education services."); cf. Valerie Leiter & Marty Wyngaarden Krauss, Claims, Barriers, and
Satisfaction: Parents' Requests for Additional Special Education Services, 15 J. DISABILITY POL'Y STUD.
135, 143 (2004) (noting in a study of parental satisfaction in special education that "[s]ome of the
parent-reported data are suggestive regarding school systems' attempts to restrain the size and scope
of the special education system"). Ideological and political motivations also can influence the delivery
of services once eligibility is established. See, e.g., Martha Minnow, Learning to Live with the Dilemma
of Difference: Bilingual and Special Education, 48 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 178 (Spring 1985)
(explaining that "the ambiguity preserved by [the IDEA's] statutory commitments to both the 'least
restrictive' and the 'appropriate' education permit the incentives of teachers, the desires of parents,
and the pressures of budgets to give content to the law").
104. 20 U.S.C. § 14 12(a)(i)(A) (2o04). A state need not provide public education services to
children between the ages of three and five and eighteen and twenty-one, however, unless it does so
for typical children in these age ranges. Id. § I412(a)(i)(B)(i).
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education and related services."' 5 The regulations further mandate that
all children seeking eligibility, with the exception of those claiming
coverage for SLD, demonstrate that the enumerated impairment
"adversely affects educational performance" in order to establish a
qualifying disability. Taken together, a child must show three things to
qualify under the IDEA: (i) an enumerated impairment which (2)
adversely affects educational performance and creates (3) a need for
special education and related services." Failure to establish any of these
requirements is sufficient to derail eligibility under the IDEA. The
remainder of this section explains each of these legal prerequisites to
eligibility and critically evaluates administrative and judicial attempts to
use these requirements to endorse a restrictive understanding of
disability under the IDEA.
A. CATEGORICAL IMPAIRMENTS
Unlike the broad qualification standards employed in the ADA,'
°
the IDEA has always defined disability categorically. The list of
protected impairments currently includes "mental retardation, hearing
impairments (including deafness), speech or language impairments,
visual impairments (including blindness), serious emotional disturbance
... orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health
impairments, or specific learning disabilities."'" The regulations
promulgated by the Department of Education add the categories of
"deaf-blindness" and "multiple disabilities" to this list."' The regulations
also provide definitional guidance by identifying those characteristics
necessary to establish eligibility in each enumerated category."'
io5. Id. § 1401(3)(A).
io6. Assistance for the Education of Children with Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,550-51
(Aug. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. Pt. 300). Although SLD does not technically include this
regulatory requirement, a student must demonstrate an "imperfect ability to listen, speak, read, write,
spell, or to do mathematical calculations" to establish SLD, all of which are components of academic
performance. 20 U.S.C § 14oi(30)(A) (2004).
107. Many courts continue to identify the two-part test set forth in the statute as the sum total of
the eligibility determination. See Robert A. Garda, Jr., Untangling Eligibility Requirements under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 69 Mo. L. REv. 441, 459 n.95 (2004) (discussing relevant
case law). Because the implementing regulations of nine of the ten categorical impairments require a
showing that the impairment "adversely affects educational performance" as a threshold matter,
scholars who have addressed this issue conclude this is a separate requirement for eligibility. Id. at 459.
lo8. In order to establish an actual disability under the ADA, an individual must show that he or
she has "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual." 42 U.S.C. § 12IO2(2)(A) (2000). An individual may also establish a
disability by demonstrating "a record of such impairment" or by "being regarded as having such an
impairment." Id. § I21o2(2)(B)-(C). Because the IDEA only protects actual disabilities, it has no
corollary to the latter two ADA definitions of disability.
109. 20 U.S.C. § 14oi(3)(A)(i) (2004).
110. 34 C.F.R. § 300.7 (2006).
i i i. See generally Assistance for the Education of Children with Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 56,540,
56,540 (Aug, 14, 20o6) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. Pt. 300).
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The three categories of impairment which are most intangible to the
casual observer serve most often as the subject of eligibility disputes:
OHI,"2 SLD, and serious emotional disturbance (SED)."3 Few eligibility
disputes in the OHI category challenge whether the child has an
underlying medical impairment; instead, most disputes center on whether
the impairment has a sufficient adverse effect on educational
performance for the child to qualify for coverage under the statute."4 In
contrast, because the SED and SLD categories are defined by vague
statutory and regulatory criteria, administrators are more likely to
dispute whether the child actually has a medical impairment that is
covered by the IDEA.
I. Serious Emotional Disturbance (SED)
Many scholars have argued that children in the SED category are
often under-identified and underserved, and Congress has acknowledged
as much."5 The regulations provide that to be eligible for services as
SED, a child must demonstrate:
a condition exhibiting one or more of the following characteristics over
a long period of time and to a marked degree that adversely affects a
child's educational performance:
(A) An inability to learn that cannot be explained by intellectual,
sensory or health factors.
112. "Other health impairment" is defined in the regulations to mean:
having limited strength, vitality, or alertness, including a heightened alertness to
environmental stimuli, that results in limited alertness with respect to the
educational environment, that-
(i) Is due to chronic or acute health problems such as asthma, attention deficit
disorder or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, diabetes, epilepsy, a heart
condition, hemophilia, lead poisoning, leukemia, nephritis, rheumatic fever,
sickle cell anemia, and Tourette syndrome; and
(ii) Adversely affects a child's educational performance.
Id. Tourette syndrome was added to this list in 2006 by the Department of Education. Id.
113. A December 15, 2006, search of reported special education decisions in the IDELR and LRP
publications revealed that eligibility challenges were most common in relation to the categories of
SED (151 cases), SLD (13 cases), and Attention Deficit Disorder (66 cases), the most litigated
impairment under the OHI category. See Special Ed Connection Website,
http://www.specialedconnection.com (last visited April 20, 2007).
II4- See, e.g., Alvin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. A.D., Civil Action No. G-o5-678, 2006 WL 2880513, at *5-
7 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 2006) (finding that child had ADD but was ineligible under the IDEA because he
did not "need special education"); Conroe Indep. Sch. Dist., 39 IDELR 17 (Tex. SEA 2003) (finding
that child had ADD but was ineligible under the IDEA because he did not need special education).
115. H.R. Rep. No. O-544, at 39 (199o); see also Theresa Glennon, Disabling Ambiguities:
Confronting Barriers to the Education of Students with Emotional Disabilities, 6o TENN. L. REV. 295,
303 (1993) ("Notwithstanding the IDEA and efforts by the United States Department of Education,
fewer than one-half of this nation's children with serious emotional disabilities are being identified and
provided special education services."); Lucy W. Shum, Educationally Related Mental Health Services
for Children with Serious Emotional Disturbance: Addressing Barriers to Access Through the IDEA, 5
J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 233, 233-34 (2002) (explaining that "many factors contribute to the under-
identification and inconsistency in identification of children with SED").
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(B) An inability to build or maintain satisfactory interpersonal
relationships with peers and teachers.
(C) Inappropriate types of behavior or feelings under normal
circumstances.
(D) A general pervasive mood of unhappiness or depression.
(E) A tendency to develop physical symptoms or fears associated with
personal or school problems.1
6
Both the duration and the severity requirements noted in the
regulations are undefined and give significant discretion to the eligibility
team."7 Because the causes of SED and its manifestations may diverge
significantly from child to child, even well-meaning decision makers can
find it challenging to identify the children intended to be served by this
category."'
The regulations make clear that although children with
schizophrenia are covered, children who are "socially maladjusted" are
not unless they demonstrate the characteristics of emotional disturbance
identified in the regulation."9 This limitation allows bias relating to
mental illness and conduct disorders to potentially play a key role in
eligibility decisions.'20 Conduct that is disruptive and antisocial can easily
be characterized as the product of intentional choice and poor character
rather than the manifestation of a mental impairment.' 2 ' When this
interpretation dominates, even children with significant emotional issues
that manifest in the school environment are denied eligibility under the
IDEA on the grounds they have no covered disorder.
116. Assistance for the Education of Children with Disabilities, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,540, 56,549-50
(Aug. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. Pt. 300).
117. See Shum, supra note 115, at 240 (noting that these requirements are "completely
subjective").
iI8. See, e.g., Julia C. Dimoff, The Inadequacy of the IDEA in Assessing Mental Health for
Adolescents: A Call for School-Based Mental Health, 6 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 319, 323 (2003)
("[T]he identification of these disorders is made more difficult because there is such a wide spectrum
of diagnostic choices," making "[t]he diagnosis process ... erratic and inaccurate at times resulting in
over-diagnosis as well as under-diagnosis."); Shum, supra note I15, at 239.
ii9. Assistance for the Education of Children with Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 56,540, 56,549-50
(Aug. 14, 2oo6) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. Pt. 300).
120. Cf Dimoff, supra note 118, at 338 (arguing that "decisions concerning the evaluation and
treatment of any child are highly dependent on social and cultural issues, and judgments made by
individuals in the child's environment, usually the teacher"); Hensel, supra note 25, at 1168-7o
(describing a judicial tendency to characterize behavior as voluntary when it springs from a mental
rather than physical impairment).
121. See, e.g., Glennon, supra note 115, at 327 (arguing that many cases involving SED eligibility
decisions "demonstrate school officials' belief that misbehavior is an issue of control of the school
environment, not an issue of learning. School officials catalog the misbehavior of the child in close
detail. Little information is given about the child's history, learning goals, or the relationship between
the child's disability and the behavior problems discussed by the decisionmaker"); Shum, supra note
I t5, at 244-46 (discussing relevant case law).
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2. Specific Learning Disability (SLD)
Although the subject of fewer eligibility disputes, the SLD category
has received the most attention from scholars and the media. Some
scholars have credited EAHCA's initial success to the confluence of
interests and advocacy between civil rights proponents and a group of
largely middle class white parents who desired to secure assistance for
their children's academic difficulties.2 ' It quickly became the largest
enumerated category following passage of EAHCA, and almost as
quickly came under attack as a "bogus" disability."3 Critics have argued
both that the designation is not scientifically based, and that, unlike
students with severe physical and mental impairments, students with
SLD do not have a history of stigmatization and outright exclusion from
school warranting legislative protection."
As discussed supra, the class of children intended to be protected as
SLD came to the forefront of the debate during the 2004 reauthorization.
Although Congress did not amend the definition of SLD in the statute,'25
it significantly altered the method of identifying whether a child has a
qualifying SLD. The statute provides that states may not require districts
to use IQ-achievement discrepancy tests and must permit the use of the
RTI method in diagnosing learning disabilities." Accompanying this
major shift in methodology was an equally significant shift in the focus of
legislators. The discussion in the 2004 debates made clear that concerns
about access to public school for children with disabilities no longer
dominate policy discussions; instead, the focus has shifted to policing
more carefully who is identified as eligible under the statute.
7
Although the RTI method promises a more contextual evaluation of
the existence of learning disabilities, it also has the potential to eliminate
122. See Panaffy, supra note 38, at 3; see also MARK KELMAN & GILLIAN LESTER, JUMPING THE
QUEUE: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF STUDENTS wIH DISABILITIES 4 (1997) ("[T]he
movement to secure rights for children with learning disabilities had its genesis in the grass-roots
mobilization of largely white, middle-class parents in the late 195os and early i96os to gain resources
for what they perceived as their 'underachieving' children.").
123. PIZZURO, supra note 18, at 48 (quoting Dr. Eileen Gardner). A 2003 report from the
Department of Education indicates that approximately 49% of students receiving special education
services do so under this category. Christina A. Samuels, RTI Method Gets Boost in Spec. Ed:
Intervention Can Spot Learning Disabilities, 25 ED. WEEK 19 (2005).
124. See, e.g., Herr, supra note 87, at 338 (concluding that "[s]chool administrators and editorial
writers probably get it right" that some children identified with learning disabilities "simply need a
good reading teacher"); Ofiesh, supra note 86, at 885 (explaining that the aptitude-achievement
discrepancy formula historically used as the definition of specific learning disabilities "served to
erroneously increase the number of students who have learning disabilities"); cf. KELMAN & LESTER,
supra note 122, at 4 ("Advocates for children with learning disabilities sought to persuade lawmakers
that at least some students among those considered 'slow' learners were in fact suffering from a ...
,specific learning disability' that concealed their true abilities.").
125. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(30) (20o0).
126. Id. § 141 4 (b)(6)(A)-(B).
127. Samuels, supra note 123, at i9.
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large categories of children from eligibility. Significantly, this method
does not recognize that "[i]ntelligent people can have SLD.' '28 Because
intervention is triggered only by poor performance, students who are
capable of performing adequately in the classroom but who nevertheless
are limited in their achievement by the existence of a "disorder in one or
more of the basic psychological processes" will not be identified for
services.'29 Moreover, RTI does not and cannot answer the question of
why a student is failing in his performance. Because this method focuses
exclusively on how to correct such failure, it threatens to collapse any
meaningful distinction between children with impairments and low
performers generally. Although this mass grouping could potentially
diminish the stigma associated with labeling a child SLD, it threatens the
ability of children with cognitive impairments to secure the due process
and individualized education promised by IDEA eligibility.30 The RTI
approach therefore may result in a significant reduction in the number of
children deemed eligible under the IDEA.
3. Other Categorical Impairments
There have been relatively few cases reported that identify eligibility
disputes based on the existence or nonexistence of the other categorical
impairments included in the statute. Congress conceivably could restrict
the number or scope of the eligibility categories in the future if it desired
to limit the number of children receiving services under the IDEA. The
imagery of disability embraced in the IDEA, however, is largely that of
the medical model. As such, an expert's verification of internal functional
limitation is likely to continue to be sufficient to establish a qualifying
impairment in these categories. '
128. Nancy Mather & Nadeen Kaufman, Introduction to the Special Issue, Part Two: It's About the
"What," the "How Well," and the "Why," 43 PSYCHOL. IN THE SCHOOLS 747,749 (2006).
129. Id. at 747. Mather and Kaufman argue that as a result of exclusive reliance on the RTI
method of identification, "high-ability students with SLD would not be identified for services because
they would partially compensate for their difficulties through the use of their verbal and intellectual
strengths and not be the lowest performers in the classroom. Thus, they would be denied the
individualized instruction that would enable them to make progress that is consistent with their high
abilities." Id. at 749.
130. Id. at 750 ("Without the use of cognitive assessments, the SLD construct is in danger of
disappearing altogether, leading to a bin called 'high-incidence disabilities.' From this vantage point,
SLD would be reconceptualized as a failure to respond to validated treatments and thus viewed as an
unnecessary diagnostic category."). It is worth noting that the stigma of being grouped in the category
of "slow learner" could in fact be worse than bearing the SLD label because learning difficulties are
attributed to a lack of innate ability in the former and medical impediments in the latter. Indeed, it was
this difference in stigma that motivated middle-class white parents to seek the creation of the SLD
category in the first instance. See Kelman & Lester, supra note 122, at 4-5.
131. See, e.g., Garda, supra note 14, at 1078 (arguing that "[d]iagnosing a child with low-incidence
disabilities is typically an objective determination" that few school officials will question).
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B. "ADVERSE EFFECT ON EDUCATIONAL PERFORMANCE"
Although each categorical impairment has a distinct list of
regulatory requirements, all categories, with the exception of SLD,
require the impairment in question to "adversely affect[] a child's
educational performance" in order to establish eligibility. 3' Put
differently, any child experiencing physical or mental limitations may be
able to demonstrate the existence of a categorical impairment under the
statute. Only those with impairments that adversely affect educational
performance in a demonstrable way, however, will be able to establish a
qualifying disability.'33
Unfortunately, beyond the regulatory terms themselves, there is
little agreement as to what this requirement means. There is confusion
both as to what counts as "educational performance" and the point at
which such performance will be deemed "adversely affected." Although
states have the ability to define these terms as a matter of state law, many
have not done so.' Such ambiguity opens the door to restrictive
eligibility determinations that refuse to recognize a covered disability in
the absence of academic failure.'35
i. "Educational Performance"
A few courts and hearing officers have construed the concept of
educational performance broadly to cover both academic and non-
academic performance, recognizing that the "purpose of education is not
merely the acquisition of academic knowledge but also the cultivation of
skills and behaviors needed to succeed generally in life.' ' I 6 A few courts
132. Assistance for the Education of Children with Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,550-51
(Aug. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300) (noting the requirement that impairments
"adversely affect" educational performance).
133. See id.
134. See, e.g., Garda, supra note 107, at 467 (noting that many states do not define eligibility
criteria as a matter of state law).
135. Id. at 465 ("[T]hese vague definitions leave eligibility teams without any standards to draw
lines between non-academic problems that qualify and those that don't."); cf. Kelman, supra note 27,
at 8o ("The distinctions that we draw between the eligible and ineligible are both arbitrary and biased
by class, race and gender."). In a study performed with Gillian Lester, Professor Kelman discovered
that "it was not uncommon" for administrators "to refuse to classify children with Attention Deficit
Disorders (ADD) as eligible for special education services" because of "the fear that, if a potentially
disruptive student were classified as disabled, it would be impossible down the road to suspend or
expel him for misbehaving." Id. Kelman concluded that "[t]he administrator may covertly resist the
status designation because it might entail more than he thinks is justified." Id. at 81.
136. Mr. and Mrs. I v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist., Civ. No. 04-165-P-H, 2005 WL 1389135, at *18 (D.
Me. Jun. 13, 2005); see also Mary P. v. I11. Bd. of Educ., 919 F. Supp. 1173, 118o (N.D. Ill. 1996)
("'Educational performance' means more than a child's ability to meet academic criteria. It must also
include reference to the child's development of communication skills, social skills, and personality, as
the Code, itself, requires."); cf. C.J. v. Indian River County Sch. Bd., 41 IDELR 120 (ith Cir. 2004)
(stating in dicta, despite finding student ineligible because of good academic performance, that "[w]e
recognize that emotional, social, and behavioral problems may be intertwined with and adversely
impact educational performance and we thus do not rule out the possibility that a student who gets
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have gone much farther, concluding that the term "includes not only the
narrow conception of instruction.., but embraces all forms of human
experience,"'3 7 covering any need or service that "would contribute [to
the student's] development as a human being."'"" If this expansive
interpretation became popular, the "adverse effect" requirement would
add no real hurdle to the eligibility determination because the existence
of a categorical impairment would, in most cases, be sufficient by itself to
establish an impact on some aspect of a child's development.'39
More commonly, however, courts have taken a narrow approach and
equated "educational performance" strictly with "academic
performance." If a student is able to achieve satisfactory grades, perform
the required classroom work, or demonstrate the ability to learn in any
respect, courts conclude that he or she does not possess a qualifying
impairment regardless of other performance difficulties in school.'4" In
those districts following this approach, children with impairments that
primarily affect their behavioral, social or emotional abilities are
routinely denied eligibility even in the early years of education when
related skills are regularly taught in the classroom.'4'
excellent grades could have behavioral problems that rise to a level where they interfered with her
learning process or educational performance"); In re Lori B., 5o6 IDELR 1oi (Ala. SEA 1983)
(rejecting district's limitation of "schooling" to "intellect, cognition and speech," reasoning that "[i]t is
the normal function of schools to respond to the totality of a child to which intellect, cognition, and
speech bear a part-whole relationship. Children go to school, not their cognition; children go to school,
not their language. Looking at these parts independently of the whole is an evaluator's convenience").
137. In re Kristopher H., 507 IDELR 183, 187 (Wash. SEA 1985) (quoting definition of education
in FUNK & WAGNALL, NEW STANDARD DIcTIONARY 790 (1946)).
138. Quintana ex rel. Padilla v. Dep't of Educ., 30 IDELR 503, 5o6 (P.R. Cir. Ct. App. 1998); see
also Dighton Rehoboth Regional Sch. Dist., 45 IDELR 146 (Mass. SEA 20o6) (rejecting argument
that student ineligible because of academic achievement where "[tihe ability to attend class on a daily
basis, to behave appropriately, to participate in group learning and class discussions, and to interact
with teachers and peers both in and outside of class are all skills that are fundamental to the
educational experience" and which "may quite properly constitute an IEP goal or objective, and may
be addressed by specialized instruction and/or a related service"); Seguin Ind. Sch. Dist., io6 LRP 6647
(Tex. SEA 1995) (rejecting argument that academic performance equated with educational
performance, reasoning that "educational needs do not involve just the academic and behavioral
domains. They include all aspects of his education, including social skills, developmental skills and
functional skills").
139. For a critique of this approach, see Garda, supra note 107, at 465 arguing that this liberal
construction of "educational performance mean[s] that the mere existence of a disability fulfills the
'adversely affects educational performance' prong and essentially reads the limitation out of the
IDEA."
140. See, e.g., C.J. v. Indian River County Sch. Bd., 41 IDELR 120, 125 (1 ith Cir. 2004) (finding no
adverse effect where "despite [student's] behavioral problems, she had a strong academic record, is an
A's and B's student, and successfully progressed from grade to grade"); Doe ex rel. Doe v. Bd. of
Educ., 753 F. Supp. 67, 70 (D. Conn. 199) (finding student who was hospitalized for depression and
aggression ineligible where grades were satisfactory before and after hospitalization).
141. See Glennon, supra note 1s5, at 343. At least one scholar has argued that courts and hearing
officers should defer to individual states in defining "educational performance," looking both to the
official state curriculum and the areas of performance that states require schools to track. Garda, supra
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This position is clearly inconsistent with that taken by the Office of
Special Education Programs,'4 which has stated that eligibility teams
"must consider non-academic as well as academic" performance when
"determining whether a child's impairment adversely affects educational
performance."'43 Under any meaningful definition, the concept of
"education" encompasses more than the restricted domain of academic
functioning, as reflected in the educational standards of many states.'" A
narrow focus on academics to the exclusion of every other aspect of a
child's development at school would seem to be a parsimonious
interpretation of this requirement that is inconsistent with the broad
legislative intent of Congress.'
45
2. Adverse effect
Evaluating whether an impairment "adversely affects" educational
performance can be equally difficult. It is unclear what degree of impact
a child must demonstrate to establish an adverse effect. It is also
uncertain whether the remedial impact of services provided to the child
outside of the IDEA is relevant to answering that question. The case law
reveals that many courts and administrative hearing officers faced with
these questions have endorsed a restrictive understanding of disability
and required strong evidence of near complete academic failure before
awarding eligibility under the statute.
Neither the statute nor the regulations contain qualifying language
concerning the degree of impact a child must demonstrate to establish an
adverse effect on education. Nevertheless, many courts and hearing
officers have refused to find an adverse effect unless a child
demonstrates a "significant" or "substantial" negative impact on
educational performance.' 46  Even low grades and poor overall
note 107, at 468-75.
142. The Office of Special Education Programs is a division of the U.S. Department of Education
and has statutory responsibility for implementing the IDEA. 2o U.S.C. § 1402(a) (2004).
143. Letter to Pawlisch, 24 IDELR 959, 961 (OSEP Wis. 1996).
144. See, e.g., Garda, supra note io7, at 465-67 (proposing that courts define "educational
performance" by state education standards).
145. See, e.g., Mr. and Mrs. I v. Me. Admin. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d I, 12 (Ist Cir. 2007) (concluding
that "'there is nothing in the IDEA or its legislative history that supports the conclusion that ...
'educational performance' is limited only to performance that is graded"') (quoting Robert A. Garda,
Jr., Untangling Eligibility Requirements Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 69 Mo.
L. REV. 441, 471 (2004)).
146. See, e.g., Ashli C. ex rel. Sidney C. v. State of Hawaii, No. 05-00429 HG-KSC, 2007 WL
247761, at *9 (D. Haw. Jan. 23, 2007) (holding that "adverse effect" language requires evidence of
more than a "minimal" impact on education); cf. R.B. v. Napa Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 43 IDELR
188, 192 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (acknowledging that the district's creation of a behavior intervention plan
"indicated that [student's) behavior was impeding her learning" but nevertheless did not satisfy the
regulatory language because "it is not clear to what extent"); see also Garda, supra note 107, at 484-85
(detailing case law and concluding that "[miany decision-makers ... requir[e] that the disability
significantly affect performance to qualify").
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achievement may be insufficient to satisfy this exacting standard.'47 If this
understanding of adverse effect becomes widespread or is formally
adopted by each state, any child achieving even modest academic success
would be unable to establish eligibility under the IDEA.
Recognizing this, some courts and hearing officers have adopted a
more flexible approach, finding the standard satisfied when an
impairment makes performance more difficult for the child in any
material aspect, or where performance would be enhanced or improved
with the addition of supports and services.' The court in Corchado ex
rel. Corchado v. Board of Education was particularly thoughtful in
explaining the justification for this approach:
The [hearing officer's] reasoning, in effect, precludes a child
whose academic achievement can be described as "satisfactory"
from being able to demonstrate that documented disabilities
adversely affected the student's academic performance. This
should not and cannot be the litmus test for eligibility under the
IDEA. The fact that a child, despite a disability, receives some
educational benefit from regular classroom instruction should
not disqualify the child from eligibility... Each child is
different, each impairment is different, and the effect of the
particular impairment on the particular child's educational
achievement is different. [Denying special education benefits
because [a student] is able to pass from grade to grade despite
documented impairments that adversely affect his educational
performance is wrong.'49
Significantly, these courts consider the level of a child's academic
performance to be an important factor in determining whether an
adverse effect has been established but do not require academic failure
or near academic failure as a mandatory precursor to eligibility.'50
Instead, children with impairments causing academic difficulty in some
147. See, e.g., Gregory M. ex rel. Ernest M. v. State Bd. of Educ., 891 F. Supp. 695, 697-98 (D.
Conn. 1995).
148. See, e.g., Johnson v. Metro Davidson County Sch. Sys., io8 F. Supp. 2d 9o6, 9s8-i9 (M.D.
Tenn. 2000) (overruling AU's determination that child's "reasonable progress in school" negated her
ability to show her impairment adversely affected her educational performance where she was
repeatedly expelled from school while in a regular learning environment); Dighton Rehoboth
Regional Sch. Dist., 45 IDELR 146 (concluding student could establish an adverse effect on
educational performance despite receiving good grades where student was unable to attend school and
received tutoring at home); see also Garda, supra note 1o7, at 483-85 (detailing relevant case law).
149. Corchado ex reL Corchado v. Bd. of Educ., 86 F. Supp. 2d 168, 176 (W.D.N.Y. 2000).
I5o. See, e.g., Mr. and Mrs. I v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 55, No. 04-i65-P-H, 2005 WL 1389135,
at *20 (D. Me. June 13, 2005) (explaining that "a child's impairment need not necessarily manifest
itself in academic failure" to establish an adverse effect on educational performance), afftd, 480 F.3d I,
12 (ISt Cir. 2007) (agreeing that "adverse effect" requirement imposes no "quantitative limit,
'significant' or otherwise, on the disability"); Venus Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Daniel S., No. CIV.A.
301CV1746P, 2002 WL 550455, at *II (N.D. Tex. Apr. iI, 2oo2) (finding an adverse effect despite
above average academic performance because "a true measure of a child's educational performance is
not strictly limited to an evaluation of his performance in academics").
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meaningful respect can generally establish the requisite adverse effect on
education, thus establishing a qualifying disability under the statute.
Further complicating the matter, courts do not agree whether the
extent of the impairment's impact should be evaluated in the mitigated
or non-mitigated state. Some conclude that if a child performs
adequately with supports and services in the classroom that do not
technically meet the definition of "special education" detailed infra, then
the child cannot establish an "adverse effect" on educational
performance as a matter of law.'51 Inexplicably, no account is given to the
fact that the child's impairment must have affected educational
performance in some negative respect in order to trigger the need for the
supports and services in the first instance. The irony of this position is
further evidenced by the fact that it is often eligibility under the
Rehabilitation Act,'52 which requires a child to show that he or she has an
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, which triggers
the provision of such services.'53 It also appears to be inconsistent with an
opinion letter issued by the Office of Special Education Programs stating
that when an eligibility team evaluates a student who is passing from
grade to grade, it is "appropriate" to consider the supports and services
provided to the child in order to assess whether "the child's current
educational achievement reflects the service augmentation [and] not
what the child's achievement would be without such help.'
54
One might nevertheless defend the contrary approach by reference
151. See, e.g., R.B. v. Napa Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 43 IDELR I88, 192 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (finding
no adverse effect on educational performance in part where plaintiff's performance improved
following the implementation of a behavioral support plan under section 504); George West Indep.
Sch. Dist., 35 IDELR 287, 288 (finding no adverse effect on educational performance where student
was capable of performing well academically in the classroom as the result of an amplification system
provided pursuant to § 504); Fenton Area Pub. Sch., 44 IDELR 223, 224 (Mich. SEA 1995) (finding
student ineligible where significant outside tutoring resulted in good academic performance,
acknowledging that "[i]t is because Student X has been able to achieve in school, possibly in part
because of this remediation, that she is not eligible for special education") (emphasis added). But see In
re Joshua E., 5o7 LRP 8339, 8341 (Mass. SEA 1985) (finding student eligible despite district's
argument that student was "progressing effectively within the regular education setting without OT"
because district "ignore[d] the undisputed fact that the parents have been providing the necessary OT
services that the school has not").
152. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2002) provides that "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability in
the United States ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance." Like the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act defines disability to mean "a
physical or mental impairment that.., substantially limits one or more major life activities." 29 U.S.C.
§ 705(9) (1998). Unlike the IDEA, it does not require a child to show an adverse affect on educational
performance. Id. Children with disabilities in public school may be eligible for accommodations under
the Rehabilitation Act, the IDEA, or both. However, only those who can demonstrate an impairment
that impacts educational performance will receive the procedural guarantees and due process
protection of the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 14 01(3)(A) (2004).
153. See cases cited supra note 148
154. In re Pawlisch, 24 IDELR 949,961 (OSEP 1996).
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to the Supreme Court's interpretation of disability under the ADA. In
Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., the Supreme Court held that when
evaluating whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life
activity as a result of an impairment, courts must consider all mitigating
measures taken by a plaintiff to alleviate the impairment's effects.'55 For
example, if the use of medication controls or corrects an individual's
disorder, he or she is not disabled within the meaning of the statute in
the absence of showing effects from the medication which are
substantially hmiting.
Even assuming that this position is defensible in an ADA Title I
context,'57 however, its extension to the eligibility determination under
the IDEA is circular and fundamentally flawed. If this interpretation
controls, a school district has the power to restrict eligibility under the
IDEA simply by providing, voluntarily or otherwise, some minimal
supports and services to struggling students. Although these
accommodations may help student performance, they often will be
modest or inadequate in comparison to the substantive and procedural
guarantees that Congress extended to students with disabilities under the
IDEA.' In the ADA context, this would be akin to an employer
voluntarily providing accommodations to an employee in the workplace
and then using the effectiveness of those accommodations to argue that
the employee has no substantially limiting impairment and thus no
protection under the ADA. That the actor, whether employer or school
district, is willing to provide some assistance to an individual with
disabilities, either willingly or pursuant to other statutory obligations,
does not negate the individual's right to insist on the full protection that
the law provides. To find otherwise would restrict Congress' power to
define the scope of services that will be provided by law.'59
155. 527 U.S. 471, 509 0999)-
156. Id.
157. Most scholars have concluded that this approach is fundamentally flawed under the ADA as
well. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
158. Students eligible under the IDEA, for example, are entitled to related supports and services
that may not be available under the Rehabilitation Act, such as transition support. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C.
§ 1401(14) (2004); see also A.W. v. Marlborough Co., 25 F. Supp. 2d 27, 31-32 (D. Conn. 1988)
("While both the Individual with Disabilities Education Act, ... and section 504 mandate that local
education agencies provide a FAPE to children with disabilities ... [s]ection 504 provides relief from
discrimination, whereas the IDEA provides relief from inappropriate educational placement decisions,
regardless of discrimination.") (internal citations omitted).
159. Cf. Yankton Sch. Dist. v. Schramm, 93 F.3d 1369, 1376 (8th Cir. 1996) (rejecting school
district's argument that student received adequate support under section 504, reasoning that "[u]nder
the statutory scheme, the school district is not free to choose which statute it prefers"); Muller ex rel.
Muller v. Comm. on Spec. Educ., 145 F.3d 95, 105 n.9 (2d Cir. 1998) ("Although the provisions of an
IEP under the IDEA will sometimes satisfy a district's § 504 obligations, the converse is not generally
true.") (internal citations omitted).
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C. NEEDS SPECIAL EDUCATION
The existence of an enumerated disability is a necessary requirement
for coverage, but not sufficient to secure eligibility. In order to fall within
the perimeters of the IDEA, a child must also demonstrate that as a
result of having a disability, he or she "needs special education and
related services. ' '160 It is this second requirement, along with the
overlapping "adverse effect" regulatory mandate, that distinguishes
coverage under the Rehabilitation Act from that of the IDEA. Although
children with impairments may qualify under either or both statutes, only
those who possess disabilities which necessitate intervention in the
educational arena will secure the protection offered by the IDEA,16' a
requirement often sufficient to derail eligibility claims.
i. "Special Education"
The definition of "special education," as well as the scope of services
that fall under its umbrella, is relatively ambiguous and a subject of
debate. The statute defines special education as "specially designed
instruction, at no cost to parents, to meet the unique needs of a child with
a disability[.] ' ' ,62 The regulations further elaborate that "specially
designed instruction means adapting, as appropriate to the needs of an
eligible child under this part, the content, methodology, or delivery of
instruction to meet the unique needs of a child with a disability.'
63
Despite the statute's thirty year existence, there is little agreement
among courts and scholars as to what type of services fall under this
umbrella. '64
The Office of Special Education Programs has stated that "[t]he
plain meaning of the words 'specially designed instruction' is education
planned for a particular individual or 'individualized instruction.
'''65
Some courts and states have further elaborated that such "specially
designed instruction must go beyond the services and programs that a
student would receive as part of general education."' 6 Where that line is
drawn, however, is unclear. Few courts or hearing officers explicitly
compare the supports and services available to children in general
education with those extended to the child seeking eligibility. Instead,
I6o. 20 U.S.C. § 14OI(3)(A)(ii) (2004).
161. See, e.g., Roane County Sch. Sys. v. Ned A., 22 IDELR 574 (E.D. Tenn. 1995) (explaining that
"although the Rehabilitation Act is broader than the IDEA, the IDEA is the specific act
encompassing education for persons with disabilities").
162. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(25) (2004).
163. Assistance for the Education of Children with Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,755 (Aug. 14,
2oo6) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. Pt. 300).
164. For a broad discussion of this topic, see Garda, supra note 14, at 11o6-1124 (evaluating
"special education" case law).
165. Letter to Smith, 19 IDELR 494, 495 (OSEP 1992).
166. Troy Area Sch. Dist., 30 IDELR 5678 (Penn. SEA 1999) (citation omitted).
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most cases simply recite the services provided and conclude, often
without explanation, that the services either do or do not qualify under
the statutory definition.'
Those attempting to draw more definitive lines have encountered
mixed success. Some districts have taken the position, explicitly or
implicitly, that services provided to children pursuant to the
Rehabilitation Act necessarily do not qualify as "specially designed
instruction" under the IDEA, an argument similar to that employed in
the "adverse affect" context.'6' Although there is some judicial support
for this position,'6 at least one court has rejected this theory outright,
concluding that a service may be mandated by both the Rehabilitation
Act and the IDEA simultaneously.'70 Still others have concluded that if
the services an impaired child requires can be provided in a general
education setting, they necessarily are not "special" enough to warrant
167. Compare Mr. I v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist., 480 F.3d 1, 20 (ISt Cir. 2oo7) (affirming that "social-
skills and pragmatic-language instruction are 'specially designed instruction"'), Yankton Sch. Dist. v.
Schramm, 93 F.3d 1369, 1374 (8th Cir. 1996) (concluding that child with cerebral palsy was receiving
"special education" services where her "teachers shortened or modified the length and nature of her
writing assignments, provided her with copies of their notes, and taught her how to type using only her
left hand and the first finger of her right hand"), and Birmingham and Lamphere Sch. Dists. v.
Superintendent of Pub. Inst. Mich., 328 N.W.2d 59, 63 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) ("We find no reason to
question the local hearing officer's conclusion that the proposed summer enrichment activities
(camping, field trips, swimming, other sports, playground and recreational activities, gardening and
work skills training) fall within the broad definitions of 'special education' and 'related services."'),
with St. Clair County Bd. of Educ., 29 IDELR 688, 69o (Ala. SEA 1998) (finding that services received
by student with orthopedic challenges, including the services of an aid to assist with mobility, were not
"specially designed instruction"); Nagle v. Wilson Sch. Dist., 21 IDELR 794, 795, 798 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
(finding by eligibility team that student did not need special education upheld despite team's
development of a Notice of Recommended Assignment extending student accommodations, including
monitoring her progress on "benchmark dates" to determine the success of the IEP), vacated, 70 F.3d
751 (3d Cir. I995); In re Laura H., 5o IDELR 242 (Mass. SEA 1988) (explaining that correspondence
course, individual tutoring, and guidance services deemed "regular modifications of school
curriculum" for student with multiple chemical sensitivity); Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 507 IDELR
435 (Cal. SEA 1986) (denying eligibility "because modifications in the regular school program are
feasible and have a good chance of ameliorating her difficulties"), and In re S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 505
IDELR 155 (Ca. SEA 1983) (holding that emotionally disturbed student's treatment in an adolescent
day treatment program would qualify as a related service but not as "specially designed instruction"
because "the focus of the program is to provide psychological and emotional therapy").
168. See infra Part II.B.
169. See, e.g., George West Indep. Sch. Dist., 35 IDELR 287, 288 (Tex. SEA 2001) (finding that
amplification system provided to hearing-impaired student pursuant to § 504 was not "special
education" in concluding student not eligible under IDEA, reasoning that "[a]lthough she works hard
at her studies, and although she needs the amplification device to assist her in the classroom
environment, these facts alone do not rise to the level of an educational 'need' for special education
for IDEA eligibility purposes").
170. Yankton, 93 F.3d at 1376; see also Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 30 IDELR iooO, lOOO-o2 (Ariz.
SEA 1999) (rejecting district's argument that accommodations provided to student pursuant to § 504,
including "preferential seating ... and the teacher's special individualized instruction, attention and
guidance in his classroom efforts" precluded his eligibility under the IDEA).
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eligibility.7 ' There has not been wide support for this position, however,
and it seems to conflict directly with the IDEA's mandate that children
with disabilities be educated in the least restrictive environment "[t]o the
maximum extent appropriate.""'7 If this position were taken to its logical
conclusion, any service which enabled a child to secure academic success
in general education would be deemed sufficient to negate his IDEA
eligibility.
As is apparent, the open-ended nature of "special education" gives
considerable discretion to the eligibility team. That discretion may be
expanding as a result of the passage of the No Child Left Behind Act
("NCLB"), 173 which emphasizes an individualized approach to meeting
the needs of each child in the classroom. 174 This trend is laudable in that it
works to ensure the success of all children, whether disabled or not, and
rejects the one-size-fits-all approach to education which has dominated
in prior decades. It opens the door, however, to those who would restrict
eligibility to students with more severe impairments. As the
individualization trend blurs the line between "special" education and
general education, virtually any accommodation provided in a general
classroom setting could theoretically be classified as a routine
accommodation rather than special education. This may be true even if a
child receives more accommodations in the aggregate than typical
children in the classroom. If this shift occurs, students receiving
accommodations in general classrooms will have a difficult time
establishing eligibility under the IDEA. The educational supports
secured by NCLB are unlikely to make up for the loss of IDEA
eligibility, moreover, because NCLB does not require districts to consult
with parents in devising adequate educational plans and bestows no
171. See, e.g., Troy Area Sch. Dist., 30 IDELR at 5678; cf. Bd. of Educ. v. Ambach, 453 N.Y.S.2d
895, 896--97 (N.Y. 5982) (rejecting district's argument that child's resource room instruction did not
qualify as special education because student was otherwise able to attend regular classes).
172. Pub. L. No. 107-IO, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20
U.S.C.).
173. Id.
174. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 63 11(b)(3)(C)(xii) (2000) (requiring states to "produce individual
student interpretive, descriptive, and diagnostic reports" after assessments are completed so as to
"allow parents, teachers, and principals to understand and address the specific academic needs of
students"); see also Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Aligning or Maligning? Getting Inside a New IDEA,
Getting Behind No Child Left Behind, and Getting Outside of It All, 15 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 27
(2004) ("If [NCLB] is truly working, this law would permit educators and parents to tailor their
instructional approaches to individual students who are not making progress under the standardized
curriculum-for a variety of reasons."). But see Philip T.K. Daniel, No Child Left Behind: The Balm of
Gilead has Arrived in American Education, 206 W. EDuc. L. REP. 791, 804 (2006) (criticizing NCLB as
inflexible because "[a] one-size-fits-all approach is used and subject matter content is in the hands of
the states and away from teachers, administrators, and even the local school board"); Rentschler,
supra note 1o, at 639 (describing the "conflict between the individualized nature of special education
and the NCLB focus on mass testing and systemic accountability of schools and school districts").
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enforceable individual rights when disagreements arise.'75
2. "Needs"
Assuming that the student can demonstrate that the supports and
services in question qualify as special education, he or she still must
demonstrate that there is a "need" for such services. Congress has
provided no definition for this term, leaving the eligibility team with "a
wholly subjective standard.' ', 6 Once again, courts and hearing officers
regularly conclude that any child capable of academic success cannot
establish the requisite need for services under the statute.'77 Even
acknowledged disabilities that require the child to work significantly
harder than a typical student in order to achieve comparable success may
be deemed insufficient to satisfy this part of the eligibility
determination. 178
Other courts, however, have rejected this "bright line rule,"
concluding that the Supreme Court "clearly repudiated the notion that
grades can serve as IDEA's litmus test"'' 79 in Board of Education of
Hendrick Hudson Central School District vs. Rowley.'8° In Rowley, the
Supreme Court held that a child's ability to advance from grade to grade
175. Daniel, supra note 174, at 805 (noting that remedy under NCLB is "limited to the possible
loss of federal funds when the Office of Education renders a finding of failure to comply with the law
or compliance cannot be secured through voluntary means").
176. Garda, supra note 14, at 1125.
177. See, e.g., Alvin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Patricia F., No. Go5-678, 2006 WL 2880513, at *6 (S.D.
Tex. Oct. 6, 2o06) (finding child with ADD ineligible despite disciplinary problems where student
achieved passing grades and passed standardized testing); C.J. v. Indian River County Sch. Bd., 39
IDELR 186, i88 (S.D. Fla. 2003), aff'd, 41 IDELR 120 (IIth Cir. 2004) (denying eligibility where
students "performance in the classroom indicates that she requires neither specially designed services
nor related services for her to benefit from education"); Fenton Area Pub. Schs., 44 IDELR 223, 225
(Mich. SEA 1995) (holding that student with admitted "severe discrepancy between ability and
achievement" could not establish eligibility where she nevertheless "has been able to succeed in
school"); In re Laura H., 5o9 IDELR 242 (Mass. SEA 1988) (concluding student with history of
absenteeism and "access difficulties" did not "need special education" under the IDEA where there
was "no indication that she cannot continue to make effective educational progress in the regular
education program, particularly with the modifications (including regular education guidance services)
offered"); Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 507 IDELR 435 (Ca. SEA 1986) (finding that student did not
need special education although there was "no question" that her emotional problems adversely
affected her educational performance where modifications in the regular school program, like pre-
selecting the student's teachers, were "feasible" and "had not been explored").
178. See, e.g., Fenton Area Pub. Schs., 44 IDELR at 223, 225 (admitting that "[i]t must be very
difficult [for petitioner] to understand why the reward for working so hard is that she is not eligible for
special education and related services"). But see W. Chester Area Sch. Dist. v. Bruce, 194 F. Supp. 2d
417, 421 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (finding that student demonstrated a need for special education despite
receiving passing grades in part because of "the extensive amount of time Chad spent out of class
receiving remedial and supplement assistance from his mother").
179. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist. v. Bruce C., 194 F. Supp. 2d at 425; see also Elida Local Sch. Dist.
Bd. of Educ. v. Erickson, 252 F. Supp. 2d 476, 491 (N.D. Ohio 2003); Johnson v. Metro Davidson
County Sch. Sys., io8 F. Supp. 2d 906, 918-19 (M.D. Tenn. 2ooo) (finding student eligible despite
adequate academic performance where student was repeatedly expelled from school).
18o. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
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is strong evidence that a child is receiving a Free Appropriate Public
Education (FAPE) under the statute. 8' It clarified in a footnote,
however, that such evidence is not definitive and does not result in an
automatic finding that the child is receiving FAPE. s2 Some courts have
reasoned that if passing grades are insufficient to establish FAPE, they
are even less definitive in determining initial eligibility under the
statute.' Such courts look to indicators of "educational need" above and
beyond academic performance, including "behavioral progress and the
acquisition of appropriate social skills," in evaluating whether a child is
eligible for services.
I -
D. THE FRUITS OF ELIGIBILITY: A FREE APPROPRIATE PUBLIC EDUCATION
Each child who meets the eligibility criteria detailed above is
entitled to FAPE, which includes the delivery of special education and
related services8 tailored to meet the "unique needs" of the child.'
86
Districts are required to provide FAPE in the "least restrictive
educational environment" to the "maximum extent appropriate ''187 in
order to ensure that children with disabilities are not segregated from
18i. Id. at 203.
182. Id. at 203 n.25.
183. See Venus Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Daniel S., No. CIV.A. 3oCVs746P, 2002 WL 550455, at *12
(N.D. Tex. Apr. II, 2002) ("As the Supreme Court noted, the achievement of passing marks and the
advancement from grade to grade is an important factor in determining educational need, but it is only
one factor in this analysis.") (citation omitted); Mary P. v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 919 F. Supp. 1173,
ii8o (N.D. I11. 1996) ("Because the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the notion that the sole test for
an appropriate education was advancement from grade to grade, or, in other words, academic
achievement, the court finds no authority from Rowley to impose such a requirement on the test for
eligibility in the present case."); cf. Mr. and Mrs. I v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 55, No. Civ. o4-165-P-
H, 2005 WL 1389135, at *18 (D. Me. June I3, 2005) ("Relevant Maine regulations-which fill the
IDEA regulations' definitional void with respect to the term 'educational performance'- make clear
that a student's eligibility for special-education services in this state does not hinge on whether his or
her disability adversely affects an academic area ....").
184- Venus, 2002 WL 550455, at *ii (finding educational need despite superior academic
performance where "the documentary evidence showed that [the student's] behavior was a constant
challenge to himself, his teachers ... and his parents"); cf. Analysis of Comments and Changes to 2006
IDEA Part B Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,547, 46,580 (Aug. 14, 2006) ("[C]hildren do not have to fail
or be retained in a course or grade in order to be considered eligible for special education and related
services.").
185. "Related services" are defined in the statute as "transportation, and such developmental,
corrective, and other supportive services ... as may be required to assist a child with a disability to
benefit from special education, and includes the early identification and assessment of disabling
conditions in children." 20 U.S.C. § 14 O1(26)(A) (Supp. IV 2004). Typical services provided under this
statute include speech-language pathology services, occupational therapy, psychological services, and
health services performed by someone other than a physician. Id.; see also Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 892-93 (984) (holding that the Secretary of Education's interpretation of the
"medical services" exclusion in § 1401 to refer only to services performed exclusively by a physician is
a reasonable interpretation of the statute).
i86. 20 U.S.C. § 14 00(d)(i)(A); Assistance for the Education of Children with Disabilities, 71 Fed.
Reg. 46,755 (Aug. I4, 2006) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300).
187. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2004).
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their typical peers. One of the most significant aspects of eligibility is the
procedural protection extended to students and parents. The statute
requires districts to consult with parents in forming a student's
individualized education plan '88  and permits parents to seek
administrative and judicial review in the event that agreement cannot be
reached.'" Studies have shown that a credible threat of litigation can
motivate otherwise indifferent administrators to thoughtfully consider
parental input and reach compromises that are acceptable to parents and
the district.'"
III. PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF "CHILD WITH A DISABILITY": THE
RISING CRISIS IN SPECIAL EDUCATION
There is little doubt that the students Congress intended to be
eligible for services when it enacted EAHCA look somewhat different
than the majority of those served under the IDEA today. As the
legislative history reveals, the primary goal in the early years of the
legislation was to provide educational opportunities to children with
relatively severe impairments who historically had been shunned or
subjected to discriminatory treatment. Few at that time would have
anticipated that the largest number of children served under the statute
would be those with the least severe impairments. 9 ' Some have viewed
this trend with suspicion, calling for renewed attention to the eligibility
criteria out of fear that the numbers of qualifying children will
overwhelm the resources allocated under the IDEA and render
meaningless any distinction between general and special education. '92 As
the prior section demonstrates, many courts and administrative hearing
officers have heeded this call by adopting restrictive interpretations of
the statutory eligibility terms.
Although the rising number of special education students inevitably
will present challenges to school districts, the remainder of this Article
argues that this increase is a positive reflection of the IDEA's success in
reducing the pervasive stigma attached to disability, at least as it relates
to children. By defining disability broadly and contextually, the IDEA
has avoided the entrenched problems created by the ADA's coverage of
188. See 20 U.S.C. § 141,(d)(I)(B)(i) (2004) (identifying parents as members of the IEP team);
§ 14 14 (d)(3)(A)(ii) (requiring IEP team to consider "the concerns of the parents for enhancing the
education of their child" in developing an IEP).
189. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i) (2004).
i9o. Martin A. Kotler, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: A Parent's Perspective and
Proposal for Change, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 331, 341 (1994). Affluent and educated parents are in
the best position to secure district cooperation because they can most credibly make a threat of
litigation. See id. ("Procedural protections all too often have been reduced to mere empty ritual for all
but the most educated and wealthy.").
191. See sources cited supra note 59.
192. See sources cited supra note 20.
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only "substantially limiting" impairments. Because calls for restricting
IDEA eligibility to the "truly disabled" would return the focus to the
severity of a child's internal medical limitations rather than the
contextual need for assistance, they are ill-advised and represent an
undesirable return to the medical model of disability.
A. SEVERITY AS PROXY FOR FUNDING ENTITLEMENTS
Throughout history, society has relegated people with disabilities to
the margins of the community. The existence of any impairment, whether
physical or mental, has been sufficient to place an individual into the
category of "other" and well outside the normal social order.'93 In the
medical model of disability, there is no recognition of a continuum of
human ability or the potential for changing status across time. To put it
simply, either one is disabled, or one is not.'94 Because disability arises
from internally generated medical limitations which naturally separate
people, society is neither responsible for the exclusion of people with
disabilities from the mainstream nor concerned with this population
outside of the benevolent desire to bestow charity on the less fortunate.'95
The requirement in EAHCA and IDEA to educate children with
disabilities in the least restrictive environment reflected a monumental
shift toward a social model of disability, which acknowledges the role of
cultural attitudes and environment in shaping the experience of
impairment.'6 Congress explicitly recognized that "[d]isability is a
natural part of the human experience" rather than an aberrant state.'" In
requiring educators to meet the individual needs of these children,
Congress acknowledged that institutional arrangements and disability
stigma may pose greater obstacles to their educational success than their
internal medical limitations. Mandating the inclusion of children with
disabilities into mainstream classrooms simultaneously expanded the
educational opportunities of these children and diminished the stigma of
193. Cf Richard K. Scotch, Models of Disability and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 213, 219 (2OOO) (explaining that in the medical model of disability, internal
functional limitations are "typically linked to incapacity and dependence, which, in turn, may lead to
social and economic isolation").
194. This concept is readily evident in the universally accepted image of disability: a wheelchair.
People are confident that they understand the nature of these limitations and their legitimacy.
195. For a general discussion of the medical model of disability, see Wendy F. Hensel, The
Disabling Impact of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Actions, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141, 146-
47 (2005), and Deborah Kaplan, The Definition of Disability: Perspective of the Disability Community,
3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'y 352, 353 (2000) ("Society has no underlying responsibility to make a
'place' for persons with disabilities, since they live in an outsider role waiting to be cured.").
196. See, e.g., Suzanne Rice, The Social Construction of "Disabilities": The Role of Law, 33 EDuc.
STUD. 169, 175 (2002) (describing the shift in the social imagery of disability in the wake of early court
decisions and Congressional action regarding children with disabilities as radical). For a general
discussion of the social model of disability, see Hensel, supra note 195, at 147-49.
197. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(C)(I) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
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otherness and isolation that formerly served as the hallmarks of public
education.
The calls to restrict the IDEA to the "truly disabled" and insistence
on academic failure prior to eligibility represent subtle but distinct
challenges to the normalization of disability in education and recognition
of disability as a social construct. When the label is attached only to those
children with the most severe impairments incapable of any meaningful
academic success, the view of disability as a medical state suffered only
by unfortunate individuals outside of the norm is reinstated. Disability is
no longer viewed as part of the natural variation in human functioning,
but instead as a destination reserved for those unable to function
alongside "normal" peers. The medical model of disability is resurrected,
and the contextual experience of disability as a social construct is, at best,
given secondary consideration. Under such circumstances, the stigma
attached to disability will inevitably rise.
This change in the imagery of disability and return to a medical
model of disability represents more than a troublesome theoretical shift
for scholars to ponder. Once this view becomes widespread, it may have
a significant substantive impact on the inclusion of children with
disabilities into general education classrooms and the exposure of typical
peers to children with impairments. Children with less severe
impairments are likely to have the best opportunity for meaningful
integration into mainstream classrooms. Many children with learning
disabilities, for example, can succeed in general education when provided
with additional individualized instruction or alternative methods of
delivery that often enhance the learning opportunities of other children
in the classroom.'o Limiting the reach of the IDEA to only those with
serious impairments threatens to transform special education into a place
rather than a set of services. Because children with more significant
impairments may be less likely to secure an appropriate education in an
integrated setting, the severity-linked identification of disability becomes
irretrievably associated with a self-contained classroom separate and
apart from the general school population. Whatever the cost savings
generated by restricted eligibility, they come at a steep price to the
community of people with disabilities and to society at large."9
One need look no further than the Americans with Disabilities Act
for a cautionary tale in this regard. When the ADA was passed in 1990,
198. See, e.g., Horn and Tynan, supra note 12, at 42.
199. See, e.g., CHAMBERS ET AL., supra note 15, at 7-9. The data on district expenditures shows that
the categories of disability with the highest percentage of expenditures on general education services
are specific learning disabilities (SLD), speech-language impairments (SLI), and other health
impairments (OHI). The authors conclude that "the disability categories associated with the highest
total spending (i.e., generally, the lower incidence categories) tend to spend relatively more on special
relative to regular education services, and vice versa." Id. at 9.
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disability advocates celebrated what they believed to be the beginning of
the end of society's marginalization of millions of Americans with
physical and mental impairments."c Many believed that the ADA would
facilitate the integration of people with disabilities into all facets of life.2"'
Today, however, a broad consensus has emerged concluding that the
legislation has failed to achieve these goals,202 and most scholars lay
blame at the feet of the definition of disability adopted in the statute.'°3
The ADA, unlike other civil rights litigation, requires all litigants to
establish in the first instance that they are members of the class protected
by law. The legislation's anti-discrimination and reasonable
accommodation mandates do not arise unless and until an individual
demonstrates that he or she has an impairment which substantially limits
a major life activity." The Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed a
restrictive definition of disability, and lower courts have followed suit."5
As a result, the focus of most ADA employment cases has been not on
200. See, e.g., Susan Stefan, Delusions of Rights: Americans with Psychiatric Disabilities,
Employment Discrimination and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 52 ALA. L. REV. 271, 271 (2000)
("When President Bush signed the Americans with Disabilities Act in the Rose Garden among
hundreds of people with disabilities, the mood was one of tremendous hope and triumph.").
201. See id. at 271-72.
202. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, Afterword: Socio-Legal Backlash, 21 BERKELEY J. EMp. &
LAB. L. 476, 476 (2000) (noting that society "just do[es]n't get it," and theorizing that "the ADA, at
least as its drafters conceived it, somehow got too far ahead of most people's ability to understand the
social and moral vision on which it was premised"); McGowan, supra note 25, at 36 ("If the ADA was
meant to be a revolutionary remaking of America, then the judicial interpretation and implementation
of the ADA's employment title has been nothing less than a betrayal of the ADA's promise.").
203. See, e.g., Eichhorn, supra note 25, at i4o8 ("Although the ADA has been hailed as the chief
accomplishment of a civil rights movement on behalf of people with disabilities, the way in which
'disability' is defined in the statute has undercut its effectiveness as a guarantor of civil rights.");
Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The Supreme Court's Definition of Disability Under the ADA: A Return to the
Dark Ages, 52 ALA. L. REV. 321, 321 (2000) (stating that recent Supreme Court decisions addressing
interpretation of the definition of disability in the ADA "drastically curtailed the number of persons
who may seek protection from discrimination on the basis of disability under the ADA and seriously
limited the circumstances under which even individuals with obvious disabilities may seek protection
from discrimination").
204. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000). Litigants may also establish membership in the protected
class by demonstrating a record of disability or that they are regarded as having a disability. Id.
§ 12102(2)(B)-(C). Even under these prongs, however, a litigant must show either an actual or
imagined impairment which substantially limits a major life activity. See Sutton v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 527 U.S. 471,489 (i999).
205. See, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 200-02 (2002) (holding that
an employee who could not perform repetitive manual tasks on the job was not disabled because she
nevertheless could perform manual tasks at home like brushing her teeth); Sutton, 527 U.S. at 488
(holding that courts must take into account all mitigating measures employed by plaintiffs in
determining whether plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the ADA); Murphy v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 521 (1999) (holding that courts must take into account all mitigating measures
employed by plaintiffs in determining whether plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the ADA).
For a general discussion of how these cases have restricted the definition of disability under the
statute, see Lisa Eichhorn, The Chevron Two-Step and the Toyota Sidestep: Dancing Around the
EEOC's "Disability" Regulations Under the ADA, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 177 (2004).
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the defendant's allegedly discriminatory behavior or failure to
accommodate a plaintiff with impairments, but instead on the extent of
the plaintiff's internal limitations, consistent with a medical model of
disability.'06 The drive to limit the ADA to the "truly disabled" has
resulted in court findings that individuals with epilepsy, cancer, and
diabetes are insufficiently impaired to be disabled within the meaning of
the statute.7 Courts have viewed an individual's ability to overcome
difficulties posed by internal limitations as evidence that no disability
existed in the first place instead of a reflection of achievement and
208progress.
The ADA's focus on the severity of medical limitations rather than
the contextual nature of disability and discrimination ignores the impact
of disability stigma on employment opportunities and the barriers that
institutional arrangements may pose to successful integration."
Particularly troubling, it has shifted society's focus from defendants'
discriminatory behavior to an evaluation of the crippling nature of
plaintiffs' internal impairments. The image of disability left in the ADA's
wake is pathetic and extreme, placing those sad individuals unfortunate
enough to possess such characteristics squarely into the category of
other. This was hardly a result anticipated by the legislation's supporters.
In the ultimate irony, those individuals with disabilities who are most
employable and likely to benefit from an anti-discrimination mandate
are those least likely to receive assistance or protection from
discrimination.
206. See, e.g., Eichhorn, supra note 25, at 1407 (citing Study Finds Employers Win Most ADA Title
I Judicial and Administrative Complaints, 22 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 403, 403-05
(I998)) (explaining that "a significant percentage of ADA discrimination claims are dismissed on
summary judgment because plaintiffs cannot prove the prima facie elements, which include disabled
status"); Wendy F. Hensel & Gregory Todd Jones, Bridging the Physical-Mental Gap: An Empirical
Look at the Impact of Mental Illness Stigma on ADA Outcomes, 73 TENN. L. REV. 47, 61 (2005)
(theorizing that "because litigants with mental impairments have more difficulty establishing class
membership, less attention is paid to defendants' potentially discriminatory actions").
207. See, e.g., Orr v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 297 F.3 d 720, 724 (8th Cir. 2002) (diabetes); Pimental v.
Dartmouth-Hitchcock Clinic, 236 F. Supp. 2d 177, 184-85 (D.N.H. 2002) (cancer); Todd v. Academy
Corp., 57 F. Supp. 2d 448, 452-54 (S.D. Tex. t999) (epilepsy).
2o8. See, e.g., Gillon v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 283 F.3d i, 22 (ist Cir. 2002) (overturning
district court's holding that amputee with one functioning arm was not substantially limited in the
major life activity of lifting based on appellant's "optimistic self-assessment of her capabilities"
because "[tihe key question is not whether a handicapped person accomplishes her goals, but whether
she encounters significant handicap-related obstacles in doing so"); cf Hensel & Jones, supra note 206,
at 56 (noting that periods of well-being for people with mental illness are viewed as evidence of
malingering and "concrete proof that no disability existed in the first place").
209. This is true even of the "regarded as" prong of the disability definition. Some litigants initially
argued that they need only show an impairment in order to establish membership in the protected
class. The Supreme Court subsequently clarified that to state a "regarded as" claim, plaintiffs must
show instead that the employer "believe[s] either that one has a substantially limiting impairment that
one does not have or that one has a substantially limiting impairment when, in fact, the impairment is
not so limiting." Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489.
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Limiting IDEA eligibility to those incapable of academic success is
equivalent to imposing a "substantial limitation" requirement like that of
the ADA. Students who look and act like typical peers in any meaningful
respect necessarily are deemed not disabled enough to qualify for
charitable intervention. No consideration is given to the challenges a
student must overcome to secure academic competence or to his ability
to succeed at other critical life skills and tasks routinely addressed in the
school environment. In the absence of complete failure, this model
acknowledges no need to reflect on the unstated assumptions of
normalcy and attitudes of administrators that may have contributed to
the impaired student's difficulties. Instead, it is the student's crippling
internal limitations that are the source of the problem and the
foundation for intervention, reinforcing a medical model of disability.
Although there are significant parallels between the IDEA and the
ADA, critics could argue that the differences between them call into
question the relevance of the comparison. ADA plaintiffs, unlike
children seeking eligibility under the IDEA, are given the Herculean
task of establishing a substantially limiting impairment while
simultaneously demonstrating qualifications for the position in question,
a tension which often is sufficient to derail class membership. ' The anti-
discrimination focus of the ADA, moreover, conceivably creates some
distance from the IDEA. Because disability animus is not limited to
impairments which are substantially limiting, scholars have argued it
makes little sense to restrict the ADA's protection to this category rather
than broadly prohibiting discrimination based on any physical or mental
limitation."' Because the IDEA is largely focused on identifying
eligibility for governmental services rather than prohibiting bias on the
basis of disability, strict class delineations in order to ensure legitimate
service delivery may not only be defensible, but necessary in the context
of that statute.
Unlike other civil rights laws, however, the ADA not only proscribes
discriminatory conduct, but also imposes positive obligations of
accommodation on private employers. Discrimination is defined in part
in the statute as the failure to provide "reasonable accommodations" to
members of the protected class."' It is this provision that is most akin to
the IDEA. Both statutes require a third party, once an impairment is
2io. The ADA only protects "qualified individual[s] with a disability." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)
(2000). An individual with a disability will be deemed "qualified" when capable of performing "the
essential functions of the employment position" in question "with or without reasonable
accommodation." Id. § 12I11(8); see also Hensel, supra note 25, at 1188-89.
211. Eichhorn, supra note 25, at 1474 ("The wrongness of [disability discrimination] does not
depend upon how severe the impairments are .... Instead, the wrongness stems from the decision-
makers' stereotyping and the vicious circle of isolation it causes.").
212. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000).
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identified or suspected, to actively engage in an interactive process to
determine how the person can best function in an environment tailored
to meet the needs of the "typical" worker or student. Because this can be
interpreted as bestowing a benefit upon an individual rather than simply
withholding a negative, scrutiny of the protected class is likely to be
intense to ensure that only the "truly disabled" are the recipients of
benefits."3
One could argue that Congress and the courts have paid more
exacting scrutiny to the delineation of disability in the ADA because the
imposition of positive obligations on private industry is more
problematic than bestowing unfunded mandates on school districts. As
special education enrollment rises and schools are required to comply
with NCLB without adequate funding, however, the competition for
scarce education dollars will increase, and with it, scrutiny of the class
receiving services under the IDEA. Such scrutiny may lead to a
reduction in funds available for special education students generally, not
only for those with more moderate impairments. Tying eligibility to the
severity of impairment undermines the recognition of disability as a
social problem for which the public is at least partly responsible. As calls
to restrict the protected class rise, public debate and court scrutiny will
increasingly focus on the characteristics of those receiving services rather
than the quality of the education extended to them, similar to the ADA
context."4
A narrow definition of disability is also likely to generate heightened
suspicion of and anger toward all individuals with disabilities, particularly
those with hidden impairments. Few are likely to debate whether the
child who has Down syndrome is eligible for services within the meaning
of the statute, or whether the child who is blind requires individualized
attention within an educational setting. Even casual observers can
appreciate the nature of such limitations, which comfortably fall within a
medical understanding of disability. Children who look and act like
typical peers, regardless of their academic struggles, are a different story
altogether. Because these children are not easily cabined within the
stereotypes of disability, their receipt of an individualized education and
213. A number of scholars have rejected characterizing the reasonable accommodation
requirement as a "special benefit" for the disabled, arguing instead that it is an antidiscrimination
provision which removes barriers to equal opportunity. See, e.g., Mary Crossley, Reasonable
Accommodation as Part and Parcel of the Antidiscrimination Project, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 86I, 864 (2004)
(discussing the benefits of "[riecognizing the essential kinship between the obligation to provide
reasonable accommodation and other strands of antidiscrimination law").
214- See, e.g., Kelman, supra note 27, at 78 (arguing that society must consider whether there are
"groups or individuals other than the disabled (for example, children of color, children with low IQs
who are not dubbed educable mentally retarded, and children facing harsh conditions at home) who
might deserve these incremental resources as much or more than those now given priority by federal
mandates in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act").
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scarce educational resources appears suspect.215 The enhanced services
and parental input deemed necessary to the education of the severely
impaired is positioned as unfair advantage and largesse in the context of
children with moderate impairments. Schools may be chastised for
indiscriminately bestowing scarce resources reserved for "real"
disabilities on typical children, leading for calls to reduce funding for
special education generally in an attempt to force administrators to stop
unnecessary spending.'rS
Indeed, the seeds of this funding backlash are already present in
public discourse. Massachusetts, convinced that schools were over-
identifying students with disabilities and too lax in containing the costs
associated with special education, changed its state funding formula in
the early i99OS.' Rather than allocating funds based on actual
enrollment of special needs students in a district, the state instead based
funding "on a preset percentage of children in special education set at a
rate lower than the state average ' ,,, 8 and "allocated less than half of what
would be required to pay for services for these students."2 '9 Eligibility,
moreover, was changed to require not only the presence of a disability,
but also a "determination that a child was not making effective progress
in regular education .... .The legislature believed that these disincentives
would cause districts to more rigorously police eligibility and placement
decisions."'
Despite the financial disincentives imposed by the legislature, the
number of children in special education in the state declined by less than
i % of the student population over the next decade.2 The funding
available to serve their educational needs, on the other hand,
indisputably declined as a result of the revised formula. 3 A study
215. Cf Perry A. Zirkel, Will "ODD" be the Next Epidemic After "ADD"?, ilo EDUC. L. REP. 1, 1
(1996) (calling the increase in eligibility of students with Attention Deficit Disorder an "epidemic").
216. See Horn & Tynan, supra note 12, at 33 (concluding that as the number of children deemed
eligible increases, "there may be a gradual erosion of the public's confidence in the entire special
education system," resulting in "a weakening of public support for special education").
217. Berman et al., supra note 16, at 187-89. At the time of the funding change, Massachusetts
employed its own standards in defining categorical disabilities. See id. at 207. It has since adopted the
federal definition of specific learning disability and emotional learning disability, however, and moved
from a "maximum feasible benefit" standard of services to the federal Free Appropriate Public
Education (FAPE) standard. Id. at 2o6-o7.
218. Id. at 189.
219. Id. at I87.
220. Id. at 188.
221. Id. at 189.
222. See id. at 189-9o.
223. Id. at 206 ("Rather than helping school districts adequately address special education cost
increases, Massachusetts' education reform foundation formula exacerbates the problem by
underestimating the percentage of children in special education .... "). Although the state ultimately
revised its funding formula to assume a larger share of the responsibility for special education
expenditures, the study's authors argue that "it is still far from the formula recommended by [many
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evaluating the shift in funding concluded that the rise in special
education eligibility experienced in the past and predicted for the future
did not flow from lax enforcement of eligibility standards, but instead
from a variety of social, medical and economic sources outside the
control of school districts."4 Despite the study's finding, children in other
states may face a similar reduction in resources if increased challenges to
eligibility result in a more restrictive definition of disability at the federal
or state level. Challenges to the eligibility criteria for children on the
margins thus have the potential to place at risk the funding needed for all
children with disabilities in education.
As this trend progresses, moreover, the stigma associated with
disability will rise. Tying assistance to academic failure and impaired
functioning creates perverse incentives to emphasize the significance of a
child's impairment in his life. Because eligibility is all or nothing, parents
and students are encouraged to characterize a child's functioning as
negatively as possible to the eligibility team. They may be reluctant to
share a child's strengths and abilities with educators out of fear that the
same will result in a refusal of services. This characterization is damaging
both to a parent's perception of his child and the child's perception of
himself to the extent that he is involved in the evaluation process.
Children with disabilities will increasingly be viewed as a bundle of
problems to solve rather than as individuals with strengths and
weaknesses in need of educational redress."5 The moral foundation of
supporting these children is no longer the educational system's failure to
meet their needs, but instead the extent of the children's internal
impairments. The resources and educational services schools allocated to
this population look more like benevolent charity and less like the
equitable distribution of resources to all children in society. The medical
model of disability, eroded by the passage of EAHCA, is resurrected as
the dominant paradigm in American special education.
B. THE PROBLEM OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION
Regardless of the desirability of an inclusive definition of disability
groups] working on special education reform in Massachusetts." Id. at 188.
224. See id. at 205. Specifically, the study identified advances in medical technology resulting in the
survival of increasing numbers of children with severe disabilities, deinstitutionalization, and
privatization of services, and increases in the number of children living in poverty or under stress. See
id. It is worth noting, however, that a study completed by McKinsey and Company concluded that
changing the eligibility rules in Massachusetts to the federal definitions "could result in up to 30,000
fewer students enrolled in special education," a conclusion disputed by the study's authors. Id. at 207-
o8.
225. Cf Leiter & Krauss, supra note 103, at 137 (explaining a recent study revealing that a
"common theme" among parental complaints relating to special education is that "school personnel
d[o] not see the child as an individual and [instead] approach the child's needs from a deficit
perspective.").
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under the IDEA, it is indisputable that the world of education funding is
limited, and that the need to draw attention to difference as a funding
mechanism may outweigh the harms of a restrictive definition. Some
scholars have pointed out that relaxed eligibility guidelines will permit
general education to absorb special education, with the result that
children with disabilities are no longer served as Congress intended."6 In
contrast, other commentators argue that eligibility must be restricted to
prevent special education from draining the resources available to
general education students."7 Both positions make clear that a tight line
must be drawn to secure funding from Congress in the first instance.
Drawing that line at academic failure or near failure as a precursor
to eligibility, however, is misguided and inappropriate in light of the
statutory eligibility requirements. The IDEA makes clear that the
eligibility team must "use a variety of assessment tools and strategies" in
evaluating whether a child qualifies for protection under the Act.28
There is little point to this requirement if even modest academic
performance automatically trumps all other indicators of educational
need. A child who, as the result of an impairment, is capable of securing
a passing grade only with significant supports in place and only with the
expenditure of significant effort is no less "adversely affected in
educational performance" than a child who is ultimately unable to
overcome such obstacles. In both cases, internal functional limitations
impair the ability to learn and achieve commensurate with typical
children. In both cases, internal functional limitations are exacerbated by
the social imagery of disability which does not acknowledge or recognize
that impairment need not be synonymous with failure.
Underlying pundits' complaints that special education is "taking
away" dollars from general education, moreover, is the implicit
assumption that typical children are presumptively entitled to all
educational funding. Education is conceived of not as a public good to
which every child is entitled, but instead as a privilege reserved for those
fortunate enough to fall within the mainstream. Any shift from this
starting point requires special justification and is immediately suspect."9
The designation "special" education itself is clearly reflective of this view
and reinforces the lesser social standing of children with disabilities. The
226. See, e.g., Weber, supra note 20, at 22.
227. See Robert Worth, The Scandal of Special Ed, WASH. MONTHLY, June 1999, at
34 (arguing that -[i]n order to pay for special ed's enormous, ineffectual bureaucracy and skyrocketing
enrollments, school districts are being forced to cheat their conventional students").
228. 20 U.S.C. § 14 14 (b)(2)(A) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
229. Cf Minow, supra note 103, at 204 ("[F]or there to be an assignment of deviancy, it must be
from the vantage point of some claimed normality; for there to be a position of inequality, there must
be a contrasting position, not of equality, but of superiority. In short, the idea of difference depends on
the establishment of a relationship between the one assigned the label of 'different' and the one used
as the counterexample.").
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more justification that is required to secure funding, the more funding for
all students becomes suspect.230
If the purpose of restricting eligibility is merely to contain costs and
transfer wealth to the general student population, moreover, such calls
ignore a significant fact: students struggling academically as a result of
moderate impairments will still be in the classroom whether or not they
are officially labeled as "disabled" under the IDEA.23 ' These children
have not been, and are not likely in the future to be, successful under the
one-size-fits-all approach employed in general education. A disability
label does not alter their educational needs or the level of funding
necessary to meet such needs. 3 ' It may have a direct impact, however, on
a school district's responsiveness to parental demands. In the absence of
due process guarantees, a school district may ignore the parents of
children with disabilities with impunity because they have no enforceable
rights to the contrary. 33 This is true even with respect to IDEA funding
for newly available pre-referral services, as Congress made clear that
children served in that program do "not have the same rights and
protections as students that are identified as eligible for services" under
Part B.234
The extent of savings generated by restricting the definition of
disability thus would depend significantly on the intentions of the school
district in question. In those districts committed to meeting the needs of
students with moderate impairments, the costs associated with this
population are unlikely to change dramatically. Certainly, there would be
230. See, e.g., Caruso, supra note 17, at 193. Caruso argues that "[flunding special education
involves a leap of faith, and such leaps are especially vulnerable to political pressure. When costs rise
beyond politically acceptable levels, administrators are bound to redefine both identification and
service standards to make means meet ends." Id.
231. See, e.g., Berman et al., supra note t6, at 208 (concluding that the cost savings of restricted
eligibility "will be modest" because "children who might no longer qualify for special education
services still have educational issues that will need to be addressed"); Mather & Kaufman, supra note
128, at 750 ("Regardless of changes in legal mandates, students with SLD will still exist and challenge
school resources with their need for intensive and systematic interventions."); Seligmann, supra note
13, at 761 (arguing that policymakers must "recognize that most children with disabilities are already
members of our classrooms today").
232. Berman et al., supra note i6, at 209 ("Learning disabilities do not disappear just because a
child is not classified as a special education student. These are realities that policymakers need to
face.").
233. See, e.g., Palmaffy, supra note 38, at i5 ("Because the law gives specific, legally enforceable
rights to certain individuals, schools face powerful incentives to provide the necessary services to
eligible children. Administrators need to stay abreast of the law or they can find themselves in
court."). Although the No Child Left Behind Act mandates school accountability for all children, it
does not expressly give enforceable individual rights outside of those granted to the general student
population. See, e.g., Melanie Natasha Henry. No Child Left Behind? Educational Malpractice
Litigation for the 21St Century, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1117, 1119 (2004) (arguing that a private right of action
should be available for violating NCLB pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
234. H.R. REP. No. IO8-77, at 104 (2003).
June 2007] II89
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
fewer costs associated with eligibility determinations if certain students
were clearly excluded from coverage. Conceivably, moreover, such
districts will save the administrative expenses attributable to due process
challenges and the development of individualized education plans
otherwise associated with these students. The savings attributable to the
former are unlikely to be substantial, however, because formal legal
challenges under the IDEA are rare even in inferior school districts and
represent less than 0.3% of all special education expenditures.35 In order
to remediate the learning difficulties experienced by moderately
impaired students who are not IDEA-eligible, moreover, educators
necessarily will be required to investigate the nature of academic failure
and devise a plan for individualized remedial instruction not unlike an
IEP. 236
Presumably, those school districts experiencing the largest savings
would be those that are the least sincere and capable of educating
students with disabilities, as well as those with the fewest resources. If
students who are struggling receive educational intervention only if
mandated by law under the IDEA, then clear cost savings will result
from limiting the number of eligible students with disabilities. To the
extent that hostility to individualized education can be generalized, these
districts are also most likely to experience cost benefits as a result of
being insulated from legal challenges.
Accordingly, the debate over the perimeters of special education
eligibility should not focus on whether the additional costs associated
with educating the moderately impaired should be incurred; instead, the
focus should be on who is going to bear these costs and when. To the
extent school districts are granted permission to treat these students
indifferently, costs are merely transferred from the district to society at
large. Students whose educational needs are ignored will have a difficult
time finding employment, resulting in dependence on government
benefits and welfare programs. These principles motivated passage of
EAHCA in 1975 and remain equally relevant today.37
One may nevertheless argue that restricting eligibility under the
IDEA will result in a more equitable distribution of scarce resources
235. See JAY G. CHAMBERS, ET AL., CTR. FOR SPECIAL EDUC. FIN., WHAT ARE WE SPENDING ON
PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS IN SPECIAL EDUCATION, 1999-2000 5 (2003).
236. Some educators have complained about the paperwork requirements associated with IEPs,
and this "cost" would be diminished by reducing the number of children eligible under the Act.
Notably, however, Congress is already attempting to reduce these administrative burdens by allowing
the Secretary of Education to designate up to 15 states to participate in pilot paperwork reduction
programs. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(5) (2004).
237. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § I400(C)(I) (2004) (finding that "[i]mproving educational results for
children with disabilities is an essential element of our national policy of ensuring equality of
opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for individuals with
disabilities").
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because it will impair the ability of highly educated and affluent parents
to manipulate the system by classifying academic failure as a medical
problem. Although the diminished stigma attached to learning
disabilities and moderate disorders is positive, some contend that it has
simultaneously encouraged a subset of parents to seek eligibility as a way
of securing entitlement to services not otherwise forthcoming.38 In this
view, services under the IDEA are provided not to rectify disadvantage,
but instead to create unfair advantage for the politically powerful. The
laudability of the shift in the imagery of disability thus may be
complicated by the regressive distributive consequences of focusing
scarce resources on those with more marginal impairments.
There is little evidence, however, establishing that the number of
children identified as IDEA-eligible in wealthy districts reflects improper
classification rather than a heightened awareness of rights and
acceptance of disability in education.239 Disability stigma is often highest
in communities that do not have access to professional support and
informational services, which leads to "self-exclusion ... at the early
stages of identification."240 It is equally plausible that such numbers
reflect administrators' unwillingness, for cost reasons or otherwise, to
provide the supports or services mandated by law in the absence of
genuine accountability, which is often lacking in poor districts.24 ' Parental
input under the IDEA is desirable precisely because school systems,
focused on the costs of services, "may propose what they can do as
238. Horn & Tynon, supra note 12, at 30.
239. There is some evidence to reflect that "white students are overrepresented among students
with disabilities seeking accommodations for the SAT." Daniel J. Losen & Kevin G. Welner,
Disabling Discrimination in Our Public Schools: Comprehensive Legal Challenges to Inappropriate and
Inadequate Special Education Services for Minority Children, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 419
(2ooi) (citing Thomas Hehir, Statement at the American Youth Policy Forum Congressional Briefing
(Mar. 2, 2001) (transcript on file with authors)). At least some scholars who argue that parents have
contributed to the eligibility crisis, however, primarily rely on anecdotal evidence relating to a single
school district. See, e.g., Horn & Tynan, supra note 12, at 30 (noting that "[t]he fact that being found
eligible for special education brings with it entitlement to an array of often expensive services and
accommodations may help explain why nearly one in three high school students is officially designated
as disabled in affluent Greenwich, Connecticut").
240. Caruso, supra note 17, at 181. Scholars have found that African-American parents are
particularly likely to resist special education eligibility for their children. See, e.g., Theresa Glennon,
Race, Education, and the Construction of a Disabled Class, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 1237, 1327 (1995)
(quoting BETH HARRY, THE DISPROPORTIONATE REPRESENTATION OF MINORITIES IN SPECIAL EDUCATION
59 (1994)). "While insufficient research exists about the opinions of African-American parents, there
is some evidence that while parents often agree that their children are not performing adequately, they
do not agree with the school's diagnosis of the problem, and are far less likely than school officials to
identify children as having 'mild' disabilities." Id.
241. Cf Caruso, supra note 17, at 179 (explaining that when there is "no pressure from the family,
the definition of entitlements is likely to be determined not only by the relevant administrators'
understanding of the FAPE standard, but also by budget and resource considerations. The district will
therefore offer the family a set of educational services that can be provided with little financial
strain").
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opposed to what they should do" for a child with disabilities.242 In a
recent study, for example, 14% of the parents identified reported that
school staff refused to test their child for disabilities because they did not
believe the child needed any services. 3 Parents living in poverty have
reported even more difficulty in securing assistance from school
districts.2" As one scholar has explained,
Since the law is phrased in terms of highly flexible standards, strategic
bargaining is encouraged rather than discouraged, and families will
have incentives to engage not only in norm-centered argumentations
(invoking rules, citing precedents and producing reasoned
elaborations) but also in strategic behavior involving "the exercise of
power, horse trading, threat, and bluff." This is where having power
and plenty of horses to trade makes all the difference, because the
threat of litigation is more credible when it comes from well-off
families. Therefore, the chance for such families to win a better bargain
is much higher."5
In the wake of recent Supreme Court decisions making it more difficult
for poor and middle class parents to pursue due process challenges, this
trend is likely to be exacerbated in the future" 6
Scholars also have demonstrated that the services secured by
affluent parents willing to force disputes into litigation have at least some
beneficial effect on other children with disabilities in a school district. 7
School administrators intent on fairness between students and parents
aware of districts' treatment of similarly situated students will work to
ensure that one child's gain is replicated by others." It may be, then, that
the appropriate conclusion is not that affluent and educated parents are
manipulating the system, but rather that their counterparts are
insufficiently educated and empowered to ensure similar results. Greater
242. Leiter & Krauss, supra note 103, at 136 (citations omitted). Leiter and Krauss report that
"there is near unanimous acceptance of the premise that [parent participation in children's schooling]
leads to positive child outcomes." Id. at 137 (citations omitted).
243. Id. at 144.
244. Id.
245. Caruso, supra note 17, at i8o-8i.
246. See, e.g., Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Murphy, 126 S.Ct. 2455, 2458 (2oo6) (holding that
expert witness fees are not recoverable by parents as "costs" under the IDEA's fee shifting provision);
Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2oo5) (holding that the party seeking relief has the
burden of proof in due process hearings). One recent Supreme Court decision, however, should
facilitate due process challenges by parents. See Winkelman ex rel Winkelman v. Parma Sch. Dist., 127
S.Ct. 1994 (2007) (rejecting the argument that parental representation of children in due process
hearings is barred as the unauthorized practice of law).
247. See, e.g., Palmaffy, supra note 38, at 15 (arguing that "the availability of legal action as a
recourse is not just a boon to wealthy, pushy parents"); cf. Rosenbaum, supra note t74, at 30 ("In
contrast with other federal education policy, parents have been the catalyst in seeing that schools
address the needs of students with disabilities.").
248. See Caruso, supra note 17, at 182. Caruso notes, however, that because special education is a
world of limited resources, the well educated and affluent will still be better off because "it is
inevitable that resources will be diverted away from children of less forceful parents." Id.
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education and outreach programs for parents who are less
knowledgeable about the system of special education and greater access
to professionals would permit parents without resources to secure the
benefits extended by law.
It is equally important to note that many of the instances of alleged
abuse by wealthy parents noted in the popular press do not revolve
around whether a student is sufficiently impaired to be eligible for
assistance, but instead on the level of assistance to which he is entitled. A
recent article in one newspaper, for example, criticized parents for
seeking "extra-special" education in the form of "private day schools,
boarding schools, summer camps, aqua therapy, horseback therapy,
travel costs, personal aides and more." '249 Because education funding is
neither limitless nor elastic, a robust public debate should occur on the
types of services and aids available to assist children with disabilities.
Well intentioned people must address whether cost is or should be a
more relevant and explicit factor in administrative decision making. That
is a distinct issue, however, from the question of who is eligible as a child
with disability under the statute in the first instance.
C. THE PROBLEM OF STIGMATIZATION
Not all advocates for people with disabilities would support a call for
liberal eligibility guidelines under the IDEA. Although identification as a
child with a disability provides service entitlement, it may also stigmatize
the child, lead to harassment by peers, and diminish self-esteem and
expectations."' Accordingly, a compelling argument can be made that
children with moderate impairments are best served when they receive
appropriate educational services without the label of special education.
Indeed, many of the interventions and strategies that work best for
children with moderate impairments are employed in general education
classes, 5 ' which may explain why courts and hearing officers have had a
249. Nanette Asimov, Extra-Special Education at Public Expense, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 19, 2006, at A-
i, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2oo6/o2/i 9/MNG8THBH4VI .DTL.
25o. Former Secretary of Education Roderick Paige has testified that "[t]he stigma of being
misclassified as mentally retarded or seriously emotionally disturbed, or as having a behavioral
disorder, may ... have serious consequences in terms of the student's self-perception and the
perception of others, including family, peers, teachers, and future employers." H.R. REP. No. IO8-77,
at 98 (2003); see also Rice, supra note 196, at 172 (discussing how "[tihe act of labeling itself can create
a self-fulfilling prophecy; when children are labeled 'slow' they tend to live up to (or down to) that
expectation"); Weber, supra note 2o, at 23 ("A possible side benefit of providing services outside the
conventional special education eligibility determination framework is that students might be subject to
less of the stigma that can accompany identification as having one of the disabilities specified in the
law.").
251. Garda, supra note 14, at 1073-74 ("It is better to address diverse needs in the general
education classroom than to classify children as disabled and rely on special education to address their
unique learning styles, cultural backgrounds, and different abilities."); Horn & Tynan, supra note 12,
at 42.
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difficult time articulating distinctions between "special education" and
regular interventions. '52 If this position is correct, then children with
moderate impairments may be better served by changing the delivery of
instruction to general education classes and improving teaching generally
than by requiring individuals to acquire a special education label. In this
way, different learning styles become part of the norm, diminishing the
stigma attached to such struggles. 53
The social difficulty and victimization experienced by many children
with disabilities is a serious problem that requires serious contemplation
by policy makers. The root of this problem does not reside, however, in
the legal identification of impairment. Instead, it lies in the overt hostility
and discomfort that many continue to feel toward individuals who
diverge from the norm in any meaningful respect, reflecting the
continued significance of the social model of disability. '54 The harassment
and stigmatization of these children did not begin with EAHCA's
passage and will not end with restricted eligibility criteria. Using that
stigma to deny children with impairments the protection that the law
extends to them is fundamentally unsound; it is precisely because of the
stigma that the law was necessary in the first place. Neither adults nor
children need official labels to identify and target difference, although
labeling admittedly can facilitate their efforts. 55 This is true even with
respect to "invisible" impairments that are not immediately identifiable,
like dyslexia.56 Children outside the norm will continue to be the victims
of bullying and harassment unless and until school districts clearly
communicate that such behavior will not be tolerated in any form. In
addition, laws prohibiting bullying and providing real remedies when
such conduct occurs are needed to ensure that schools will take these
issues seriously.57 Restricting eligibility rather than dealing with the
252. See supra Part II.
253. Cf Allan H. Macurdy, Rights Respiration: Disability, Isolation and a Constitutional Right of
Interaction 3 (Boston University School of Law Working Paper Series, No. o6-40, 2006), available at
http://www.bu.edullaw/facultylscholarship/workingpapers/2oo6.html (arguing that "[t]he subordination
of individuals with disabilities in our society begins with their differentiation, with the application of a
label that reduces them to a single characteristic").
254. See, e.g., Mark C. Weber, Disability Harassment in the Public Schools, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV.
i079, io8I (2002) (noting that "much disability discrimination is the overt expression of hostility and
the conscious effort to subordinate members of a group with less power and social standing than the
majority").
255. See, e.g., Barbara Riddick, An Examination of the Relationship Between Labeling and
Stigmatisation with Special Reference to Dyslexia, 15 Dis. & Soc'v 653, 657-58 (2ooo) (discussing how
hidden disabilities like dyslexia are identifiable by other students in the absence of labeling and the
subject of stigmatization).
256. Id. at 661 (explaining that in prior studies "[miany children and adults with dyslexia reported
being informally labelled [sic] as lazy, careless or stupid before they were given a formal label").
257. See, e.g., Weber, supra note 254, at H 55 (arguing that "[s]chool personnel, parents and others
should act voluntarily to establish a climate in which harassment is not tolerated, but the legal system
operates as the ultimate tool to ensure equal participation in school without harassment for children
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underlying conduct is a short-sighted and ineffectual solution to this very
troubling problem.
The argument that children referred to special education will
unnecessarily suffer from diminished self-esteem likewise deserves
serious consideration by policymakers. Any action that causes a child to
be less motivated or confident in school should be scrutinized carefully.
Nevertheless, it is inescapable that this problem, like harassment and
bullying, derives in large part from the treatment children receive from
society once they are identified as students with disabilities.5,
Presumably, children with moderate impairments are referred for
eligibility determinations at least in part because they are struggling in
the general classroom, which itself is not conducive to high self-esteem. It
is likely, moreover, that they are aware of negative labels attributed to
them by teachers and fellow students prior to the eligibility referral and
recognize that they are different from typical peers. 59 As one scholar has
noted, "when someone gets to the point of saying about a child 'I don't
want to label him or her' they are already informally labeling the child as
a worry, troublesome, odd, vulnerable, puzzling, etc."'6' If the labeling
process results in automatic transfer into a self-contained classroom
where teachers communicate the message of diminished status and
expectations, there is little doubt that the student's self-image will suffer
significantly from the eligibility determination.26, If eligibility instead is
the gateway to improved educational services and the identification of
difficulty as intended by Congress, however, this outcome is neither
predetermined nor inevitable.262 Studies have shown that in these
circumstances, identification can actually improve self-esteem for some
students, particularly those with intangible impairments, because it
identifies the source of difficulty as something other than poor
motivation and ability.263
with disabilities").
258. See, e.g., Garda, supra note 14, at 1o83 (noting that "[p]eers and teachers significantly lower
their expectations for labeled students").
259. Nancy K. Barga, Students with Learning Disabilities: Managing a Disability, 29 J. LEARNING
DISABILrrIEs 413, 415 (1996) (finding that SLD students "sensed something was different about their
learning ability before they were ever identified as having a learning disability").
260. Riddick, supra note 255, at 66s.
261. See, e.g., Marcia C. Arceneaux, The System and Label of Special Education: Is It a
Constitutional Issue?, 32 S.U. L. REV. 225, 243-44 (2005) (discussing the stigmatizing effects of the
special education label); Barga, supra note 259, at 415 (discussing study finding that being labeled as
learning disabled in school was a negative experience for students "when it created conditions of being
set apart from peers or receiving differential treatment from others").
262. See, e.g., Barga, supra note 259, at 415 (describing study finding that labeling could be "a
positive experience when it led to getting help from the schools").
263. See Barga, supra note 259, at 415 (finding that "students described labeling [as learning
disabled) as a positive experience when it made sense out of their academic struggles and involved
getting help"); Riddick, supra note 255, at 659 (explaining that children with dyslexia often feel that
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It is important to recognize that the advancement of people with
disabilities will not be achieved by conceding that the stigma attached to
this status is so great that any reasonable person would do anything to
avoid such a label, including foregoing services designed to foster
educational success. It is in such concessions that the imagery of
disability as an unnatural and pathetic state is reinforced and entrenched.
It is only by normalizing the concept of impairment, rather than
restricting disability status to the most severely impaired, that the stigma
of disability will be reduced. If students capable of even modest academic
success are deemed insufficiently "special" to qualify for assistance, this
will not occur. It is not the legal identification process itself that harms
the student, but rather the negative imagery of disability that is
communicated by teachers, administrators and fellow students in the
wake of labeling.
Despite these limitations, it is important to acknowledge that the
separation of special education and general education does highlight the
differences between students rather than the common ground among all
learners. '64 A commitment to serve all struggling students would reduce
the administrative complexity of the current "patchwork" system of
federal aid based on student characteristics.6 5 Parents would not be
required to jump through legal eligibility hoops to ensure their child's
educational needs are met, and the focus would shift to the level of
educational services being provided rather than the characteristics of the
recipient. This approach would also address those who question whether
there is a moral basis for concluding that students with disabilities
deserve assistance while other struggling students do not."
Few would disagree that each and every child is entitled to receive
the services that he or she needs to become a successful and productive
adult. It is questionable, however, whether it is possible for schools to
effectively meet the needs of all learners without any type of labeling or
identification process as this approach suggests. Some scholars have
argued that this kind of generalized approach to academic difficulty is
"having the label dyslexia countered the more general negative attribution that they were slow or
stupid and they were therefore positive about the label at both private and a public level of usage").
264. See Rice, supra note 196, at 174.
265. See, e.g., Rosenbaum, supra note 174, at 5 ("The common sense notion that integrated laws
and practices addressing the needs of all children at risk of educational failure stand a better chance of
succeeding than a patchwork of policies pigeonholing different classes of students."); see also
Seligmann, supra note 13, at 761 (arguing that advocates "should not square off and fight over funds or
services, playing tug of war between 'regular' and 'special' education or 'regular education kids' and
,special education kids.' Instead, we should use available funds in inclusive ways"); cf. Kelman, supra
note 27, at 78 (arguing that "we should be ... wary of a system that forbids us from counting the
educational interests of 'mainstream' students just as worthy as those of pupils with disabilities").
266. See, e.g., Kelman & Lester, supra note I22, at 6 ("[A]s a society, we must make decisions
about which students deserve resources beyond those devoted to their classmates.").
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overly simplistic and "assumes that simply observing behavior is a
reliable way of identifying children's disabilities."' ' This fact, in
combination with the reality that education has never and may never
receive adequate funding to allow for the widespread individualization of
instruction, negates the wisdom of restricting special education in order
to individualize education generally, at least at this point in time. As one
scholar concluded,
[c]alls to merge special education with regular education, or to make
categorical cut backs in eligibility for special education services are
premature. They would require as a predicate a more extensive
modification of the general education system than either exists now, or
could be expected to occur on a systemic scale without a true national
commitment, both legal and financial, to the education of every child.'
68
To create a world where disability does not matter, educators and
policy makers must begin with the recognition that it does. Schools have
not demonstrated an impressive track record of providing services to
children with impairments in the absence of federal mandates. Although
much has changed since 1975, the stigma attached to this population still
thrives and continues to present challenges to people with disabilities.
Significantly, that stigma is disproportionately greater than that
experienced by other minority groups in society, particularly in the
context of mental disabilities 69 In a world of equivalent educational
dollars for each child, children with disabilities will inevitably lose. It is
not a level playing field from which these children begin, both because of
societal attitudes and internal impairments, and a level playing field in
education will only relegate these children to perennial status in last
267. Riddick, supra note 255, at 656 (arguing that "the idea that each child's needs could be
identified without reference to a body of knowledge arranged around an existing label or category" is
"optimistic and idealistic"). Riddick points to past studies in which "it was found that with out some
prior knowledge of specific learning difficulties[,] teachers were not able to construct an accurate
model for themselves which would effectively inform their mode of intervention." Id. at 657.
268. Seligmann, supra note 13, at 767; cf. Kelman & Lester, supra note 122, at 157. Kelman and
Lester argue that "[s]hould markedly higher levels of resources be available," all students, rather than
only SLD students, should received individualized education plans whenever academic performance
falls below potential. Id. They acknowledge, however, that the assumption of increased resources may
be "too optimistic." Id.
269. See, e.g., Jean Campbell, Unintended Consequences in Public Policy: Persons with Psychiatric
Disabilities and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 22 POL'Y STUD. J. 133, 137 (1994) (citing N. Colbert
et al., Two Psychological Portals of Entry for Disadvantaged Groups, 34 REHAB. LIT. 194 (1973))
(describing study finding that employers' willingness to accept someone as an employee "decreased on
a continuum ranging from ethnic background, physical disability, and prison affiliation, to mental
instability"). Although critics contend that students with SLD do not belong in this category, there is
little doubt that children with this diagnosis have experienced and will continue to experience
significant stigmatization by peers. See, e.g., Barga, supra note 259, at 429 (concluding that "[labeling,
stigmatization, and gatekeeping [are] common experiences in formal schools and college among the
students with learning disabilities"). Although this population may not have experienced the level of
stigma attached to more severe and tangible disabilities, outward aversive animus can be less
troublesome in some settings than thoughtless assumptions about abilities and limitations.
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D. THE PROBLEM OF OVER-IDENTIFICATION
Although scholars may legitimately argue over the boundaries of
eligibility, few, if any, would argue that there is any positive aspect to the
misidentification of children as disabled. Some scholars have argued, as
has Congress, that many children in this category end up in special
education because of poor regular classroom instruction rather than the
existence of internal medical limitations.27 There is a great deal of
concern in particular over the number of African-American children that
are being referred to special education. It is beyond dispute that children
improperly identified as eligible can suffer "significant adverse
consequences, particularly when these students are being removed from
regular education settings and denied access to the core curriculum."27'
The over-identification of children of color is of such significance to
the special education system because it lies at the intersection of race,
class and disability prejudice. African-American children in particular
not only are statistically more likely to be identified as eligible for special
education, but they are also more likely to be assigned to self-contained
classrooms once eligibility is established.72  Most scholars and
commentators agree that this occurs in large part because of racial
discrimination and the poor expectations often associated with people of
color. 73
Although scholars agree that this issue is serious, the tenor of the
conversation here is revealing. Many commentators acknowledge but do
not focus on districts' failure to strictly implement the least restrictive
environment requirement so that eligibility is not an automatic referral
to a self-contained classroom. 74 It is in the self-contained classroom that
270. See, e.g., Horn & Tynan, supra note 12, at 42 (arguing that with respect to students with
moderate impairments, what is needed "is not so much different interventions but good teaching,
albeit perhaps with greater consistency, intensity and slower pacing than other students require");
Losen & Welner, supra note 239, at 455 (arguing that "the problems of minority overrepresentation
and isolation in special education are rooted in the inadequacies of regular education"); Palmaffy,
supra note 38, at 2 (discussing the comment by G. Reid Lyon, of the National Institute of Child Health
and Human Development, calling the LD category a "sociological sponge to wipe up the spills of
general education").
271. H.R. REP. No. lO8-77, at 84 (2003).
272. For a general discussion of disproportionate representation, see Glennon, supra note 240, at
1251-52, 1255; Losen & Welner, supra note 239, at 412-13.
273. Glennon, supra note 240, at 1317-18; Losen & Welner, supra note 239, at 421.
274. See, e.g., Garda, supra note 14, at 1094. Garda acknowledges that one solution to the problem
of overrepresentation "may be not to prevent African-American disproportionality, but to ameliorate
its harms by strictly enforcing the IDEIA's least restrictive environment requirement." Id. He
concludes, however, because the LRE provision is "drafted as strictly as possible in favor of
mainstreaming . . . but the harms of ... disproportionality persist," the focus is better placed on
restricting eligibility. Id.
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children are the most segregated from typical peers and least likely to
follow the general curriculum. Instead, most commentators focus on the
disability identification in the first instance, which suggests that at least
some of the objection to eligibility springs from a rejection of association.
There is a hierarchy of prejudice in the United States, and individuals
with disabilities, particularly those identified as mentally impaired, are at
the bottom of the pecking order.275 Although such prejudice does not
transform improper eligibility determinations into positive
accomplishments, it reveals that the heart of this debate once again is on
the identity of disability in American education rather than on the
quality of the services that children with disabilities receive once
eligibility is established.
The fact that minorities are overrepresented in special education
strongly supports a major thesis of this Article-that loose guidelines
enable eligibility determinations to be subject to political capture.276 The
appropriate answer is not to restrict eligibility to only those with the most
extreme impairments, but instead to adopt principled guidelines that
minimize the effects of prejudice on the eligibility determination and to
enhance federal monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.277 There is
some early evidence, for example, that the inclusion of children in special
education under the reporting and accountability requirements of NCLB
may be improving educational outcomes, particularly for children of
color and children who live in poverty. Despite the disability
community's mixed reaction to standards-based expectations, early
reports in at least some districts are reflecting significant gains for
students with disabilities, in part as a result of increased placement in
inclusion rather than self-contained settings.27 8 At least some leaders in
the community, moreover, have voiced their support for NCLB,
concluding that "it is the institutional embodiment of the high
275. See Hensel & Jones, supra note 206, at 48.
276. See, e.g., Palmaffy, supra note 38, at 16 (explaining that the characteristics needed for LD
eligibility vary between wealthy districts, which "tend to ignore the legal definition of LD ... in favor
of serving any low achievers who might benefit from extra help" and "[w]orking class districts," which
tend to employ definitions which "keep their special education rolls down").
277. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. io8-77, at 99 (2003) (identifying the "rigorous methods of evaluation
and classification of disability to ensure that the evaluation procedures provide consistent results
rather than subjective decisions" as a "positive and proactive method" of dealing with the problem of
overidentification).
278. See, e.g., Joyce Koballa, Test Scores for Special Education Students on Rise, THE HERALD
STANDARD, Jan. 2, 2007 (noting that as a result of integrating special education students into regular
education pursuant to NCLB, state test "scores have dramatically increased across the board in
reading and math" in one district and improved in others receiving Title I funding); cf Losen &
Welner, supra note 239, at 411 ("Standards-based reforms, while often problematic, provide a
compelling new means for advocates to strengthen the entitlement claims of minority students and
leverage comprehensive, outcome-based remedies for all students subjected to discriminatory school
practices.").
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expectations that students with disabilities need to succeed," and as a
result of its enactment, "we have finally started to see the systems change
that is necessary for IDEA to be fully implemented for all children with
disabilities, regardless of race, ethnicity or socioeconomic status. 2 79 To
the extent that eligibility carries with it additional assistance and
placement in inclusion classrooms, there are significantly fewer negative
consequences attributable to the misdiagnosis and overidentification of
disability.
If, in contrast, the only answer to the problem of over-identification
is that of reduced numbers in special education, what goal is served
thereby? Perhaps these children will more readily remain in general
education classrooms and benefit from the higher expectations of their
teachers. If the source of the referral is at least in part attributable to race
discrimination, however, it seems implausible to argue that the stigma
attributed to these children simply disappears when the referral can no
longer be made.2 The end result, moreover, is a child who no longer has
any procedural protection or enforceable way to secure a free,
appropriate education. Although special education programs are often
inadequate, no account is taken of the child's failure to succeed in
general education, and no explanation is offered as to how the status quo
is likely to change outcomes for these children.
In a very meaningful way, the problems of over-identification are at
their zenith when special education is treated as a destination for
problem students rather than as a set of services to assist children with
impairments. This is an unacceptable end point regardless of the
perimeters of the protected class. There will always be a need for
thoughtful administrators to rigorously apply eligibility criteria. States
must provide clarity and consistency so that the eligibility determination
will not be subject to capture by politically-driven and resource-strapped
eligibility teams. Such insight, however, does not alter the fact that
educational performance is broader than mere academic performance,
and that impairments may adversely impact a child's school performance
in meaningful ways even when he or she is capable of achieving passing
grades. However significant these issues, they do not mandate the
conclusion that fewer children are entitled to services.
279. Commission on No Child Left Behind, Sep. 25, 2oo6 Hearing (statement of Madeleine C. Will,
Vice President of Public Policy, National Down Syndrome Society), available at
http://www.aspeninstitute.org/atf/cf/%7BDEB6F227-659B-4EC8-8F84-8DF2 3 CA 70 4 F5 % 7 D/
Madeleine% 2oWill% 2oTestimony.pdf.
280. See, e.g., Glennon, supra note 240, at 1317-21 (discussing the existence and effect of conscious
and unconscious racism on African-American children in public schools); Losen & Welner, supra note
239, at 419-20 (arguing that "the cause of the systemic bias [toward African-American children] is not
rooted in the system of special education itself but in the system or regular education as it
encompasses special education").
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A distinction must be made between the children who are entitled to
receive services and the quality of services they are entitled to receive.
As the President's Commission on Excellence in Special Education has
stated, "qualifying for special education [should be].. .a gateway to more
effective instruction and strong intervention" rather than a dead-end for
children deemed dispensable.2 The early legislative debates surrounding
EAHCA's passage acknowledged as much. Concerned with the
mislabeling and overidentification of children with disabilities pursuant
to the Act, the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare
concluded:
In the educational process, the appropriate identification of
handicapping conditions must take place in order to assure that a child
receives appropriate services designed to meet his or her needs. Such
identification must also take place in order that a State or local
educational agency may plan for the provision of appropriate services
to meet the child's unique needs.
In the absence of this process and without the provision of appropriate
services, the educational process for a handicapped child is totally
inadequate. There is nothing in this process, however, which justifies or
necessitates the carrying over of these classification 'labels' into the
classroom educational process itself such that the child becomes
thereby labelled [sic] as having a particular 'handicap' which for that
reason, sets the child apart as being 'different.""
This same point was confirmed by disability activists testifying
before the Committee who made clear that "they recognized the need for
the identification and labeling [sic] of their handicapping conditions, if
that identification and label meant that appropriate educational services
would be forthcoming. 2 83 The very purpose of the IDEA and other
federal legislation is to remedy the discrimination and exclusionary
treatment of people with disabilities. Legislators should not use the fact
that such ideals are neither universally embraced nor fully implemented
in American public schools as the basis for restricting eligibility rather
than aggressively pursuing solutions to flaws in service delivery that
follow. Congress has acknowledged that the IDEA has yet to reach its
goal of "improving educational results for children with disabilities"
because of the "low expectations" attached to these children. Such
expectations will never alter if those impaired students who may be best
able to maximize opportunity as a result of special education are
routinely deemed those insufficiently impaired to qualify for
intervention.
281. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON EXCELLENCE IN SPECIAL EDUC., A NEW ERA: REVITALIZING SPECIAL
EDUCATION FOR CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES 6 (2002), available at http://www.ed.gov/inits/
commissionsboards/whspecialeducation/reports.html.
282. SEN. REP. No. 94-168, at 27 (i975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1450.
283. Id.
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CONCLUSION
As disability scholars have argued for several decades, disability is
an inevitable and natural part of the continuum of human ability. There
is no clear demarcation between the able and the disabled, particularly in
the context of developing children. Calls to restrict IDEA benefits to the
"truly disabled" would return disability to a classification reserved for
those with severe and pervasive impairments clearly outside of the norm.
This characterization both enhances the stigma of disability and
reinforces a medical model wherein people with disabilities are largely
the source of their own problems.
The rise in the number of special education students has created real
challenges for school districts and policy makers. Creating clear eligibility
standards will assist in insulating these important decisions from the
political and ideological positions of the eligibility team. No line should
be drawn, however, at academic failure on the pretense that children
capable of any success necessarily cannot be disabled for purposes of the
IDEA. To continue on a contrary path both enhances the stigma of
disability and trivializes the struggles that many public school children
encounter as a result of their impairments.
The disability community must look beyond the obvious argument
of restricting eligibility in order to protect the limited resources extended
to the class. This argument exploits the natural divisions present in the
community because of the divergent impairments experienced by group
members. Historically, the most effective path to achieving social change
and integration has been to insist on the rights of all people with
disabilities. A collective commitment to the equitable treatment of all
children with impairments has been and will continue to be the most
effective way to achieve social acceptance of disability and integration
into the public schools. The fight will not be won when the typical
student agrees without hesitation to ride the short bus with his disabled
classmate; it will come when society fails to notice the length of the bus at
all.
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